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PARIS WHEN IT SIZZLES:
WHAT AGENDA 21 CAN TELL US ABOUT THE LIKELY
SUCCESS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT
Jennifer Devlin Calkins†
Abstract: The Paris Agreement seeks to address the problem of climate change,
a pressingly urgent issue, and one that is extraordinarily difficult to tackle. A primary
mitigation mechanism is the requirement that member countries report their nationally
determined contributions (“NDCs”) goals and provide metrics for measuring progress in
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. This is a “bottom-up” mechanism that does not bind
parties to particular emissions targets, but acts to shift party behavior by making progress
transparent. To predict the potential effectiveness of this mechanism, this Comment
investigates the effectiveness of a similar mechanism contained in Agenda 21, a plan of
action for sustainable development adopted in 1992.
Agenda 21 initially appeared to be effective. Similarly, the initial reporting by countries
pursuant to the Paris Agreement NDC requirement indicates that it is similarly procedurally
effective. However, Agenda 21 has failed to meet its goal of solving the problems of
poverty and environmental degradation. A more successful outcome for the Paris
Agreement may rest on how it differs from Agenda 21, including its more legally
obligatory nature, its more focused goal, and its NDC ambition “ratcheting” mechanism.
Cite as: Jennifer Devlin Calkins, Paris When It Sizzles: What Agenda 21 Can Tell Us
About the Likely Success of the Paris Agreement, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 523 (2018).

Some things are so big you don’t see them, or you don’t want to think about
them, or you almost can’t think about them. Climate change is one of those
things. It’s impossible to see the whole, because it’s everything.1
The entire world has to work together to solve global warming.2

†

I would like to thank Elizabeth Brown of Our Children’s Trust for the topic suggestion and
Professors Craig Allen, Melissa Durkee, and Sanne Knudsen; Vicky Wei; Christina Weidner; Danny
Noonan; and Chris Calkins for commenting on earlier versions of this article. This article is for Devin and
Sage.
1
Rebecca Solnit, Bigger Than That: (The Difficulty of) Looking at Climate Change,
TOMDISPATCH.COM
(Oct.
6,
2013),
http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175756/tomgram%3A_
rebecca_solnit,_the_age_of_inhuman_scale.
2
ROY SCRANTON, LEARNING TO DIE IN THE ANTHROPOCENE 53 (2015). Scranton is fairly pessimistic
regarding the potential to avoid the worst of climate change. He suggests that the biggest barrier to even
adequate action is the fact that “carbon powers the world’s political machinery and shapes our current form
of collective life . . . without . . . infrastructures built and sustained with carbon, there wouldn’t be any global
civilization to try to save.”
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INTRODUCTION

Mexico City is sinking,3 Louisiana, Texas and Puerto Rico are
drowning,4 Portugal is afire,5 and Kirabati is vanishing.6 Across the globe,
floods, droughts, heat waves, and wildfires are increasing in intensity. Rates
of food and water shortages, epidemics, and episodes of social instability are
climbing in the wake of the changing weather patterns. All of these impacts
will accelerate as global mean atmospheric temperatures continue to rise. As
French President Emmanuel Macron recently told global leaders, “[t]he fight
against climate change is by far the most significant struggle of our times.”7
Scientists in the 19th century first posited that the accumulation of
emissions in the atmosphere from industrialization might impact global
climate.8 By the 1960s, scientists knew these impacts would be dangerous
and warned governments of climate change’s possible catastrophic effects.9
3

See, e.g., Michael Kimmelman, Mexico City, Parched and Sinking, Faces a Water Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/02/17/world/americas/mexico-citysinking.html?_r=0 (describing the impact of climate change on water demand in Mexico City, where drilling
for water is causing the lava bed earth beneath the city to weaken and sink).
4
See, e.g., Christopher Flavelle, Hurricane Maria May be a Preview of Climate Change Fueled
Migration in America, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com /news/articles/2017-0927/hurricane-maria-may-be-u-s-preview-of-climate-fueled-migration (indicating that the damage of
Hurricane Maria, the intensity of which was exacerbated by climate change, is likely to result in sharp
increases in emigration off the island of Puerto Rico); Henry Fountain, Scientists See Push From Climate
Change in Louisiana Flooding, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/09/08/science/global-warming-louisiana-flooding.html (discussing the relationship between climate
change and the increasing rate of 1000 year storms); Scott Waldman, Global Warming Tied to Hurricane
Harvey, SCI. AM. (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/global-warming-tied-tohurricane-harvey/ (identifying climate changes as responsible for increasing the power of Hurricane Harvey);
Hurricane Maria Updates: In Puerto Rico, the Storm ‘Destroyed Us,’ N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/us/hurricane-maria-puerto-rico.html (describing the devastation of
Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico).
5
See, e.g., Damian Carrington, Europe’s extreme June heat clearly linked to climate change, research
shows, GUARDIAN (June 30, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jun/30/europesextreme-june-heat-clearly-linked-to-climate-change-research-shows (identifying the link between climate
change and excessive summer heat in Europe, along with resulting disasters such as the forest fires in
Portugal).
6
See, e.g., Mike Ives, A Remote Pacific Nation, Threatened by Rising Seas, N.Y. TIMES (July 2,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/world/asia/climate-change-kiribati.html (describing the likely
loss of most if not all of the territory of Kirabati to rising seas resulting from climate change).
7
Damian Carrington, Climate change will determine humanity’s destiny, says Angela Merkel,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/15/climate-change-willdetermine-humanitys-destiny-says-angela-merkel (quoting leaders at the Conference of the Parties in Bonn
calling for unified action on climate change).
8
See, e.g., Svante Arrenhius, On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature of
the Ground, 41 PHIL. MAG. & J. OF SCI. 237 (1896) (exploring the potential effect of increasing CO 2 and its
impact on radiation on the energy balance of earth’s atmosphere and global temperature).
9
E.g., Dana Nuccitelli, Scientists warned the US President about global warming 50 years ago today,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2015/

April 2018

Paris When it Sizzles

525

Yet now, more than fifty years later, global emissions continue to rise
and the mean atmospheric temperature creeps ever upward.10 The enormity
of the risk, the barriers to a solution, and the sheer complexity of the problem
have, in part, hindered efforts to address the activities that cause climate
change. As the Kyoto Protocol, the preceding climate agreement, indicates,
creation of a treaty that is unpalatable to certain parties creates the risk that
the targeted problem will fail to be addressed, even despite the inclusion of
enforcement mechanisms for these targets.11 This delay means dangerous
anthropogenic climate change is now a reality instead of a theoretical
possibility. Thus, governments and intergovernmental agencies now include
strategies to respond to the impacts of climate change—adaptation—in their
policy approaches. Climate change impacts that occur in the present require
immediate responses.12
The Paris Agreement is the most recent treaty13 arising under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) of 1992.14
When the Paris Agreement was finalized in 2015 it was hailed as a landmark
in climate change negotiations because 195 parties participated—nearly all

nov/05/scientists-warned-the-president-about-global-warming-50-years-ago-today (U.S. President Johnson
was warned in 1965).
10
RAJENDRA K. PACHAURI ET AL., IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2 (Core Writing
Team et al. eds., 2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/ (stating that “[h]uman influence on the climate
system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history. Recent
climate changes have had widespread impacts on human and natural systems.”); see also DONALD J.
WUEBBLES ET AL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REP: FOURTH NAT’L CLIMATE
ASSESSMENT (Donald J. Wuebbles et al. eds., 2017), https://science2017.globalchange.gov/
chapter/executive-summary/ (identifying that climate change is already having extensive impacts that are
likely to grow).
11
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 2, Dec. 11,
1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. The Kyoto Protocol is still in force. See DANIEL
BODANSKY, JUTTA BRUNNÉE & LAVANYA RAJAMANI, INT’L CLIMATE CHANGE L. 108 (2017).
12
See BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 11, at 2 (2017); Climate Change Adaptation Resource Page, U.
S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/arc-x (last visited Feb. 25, 2018).
13
The Paris Agreement is a treaty under international law. See Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, art. 2(a), 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. While there is some debate in the
U.S. as to whether it is a treaty for domestic purposes, the administration of President Barack Obama as well
as a number of commentators claim that it is an Executive Agreement and not subject to the “advice and
consent” requirement under the U.S. Constitution. See, U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2; Daniel Bodansky, The
Legal Character of the Paris Agreement, 25 REV. OF EUR., COMP. & INT’L ENVTL. L., 142, 143 (2016) (noting
that the U.S., under its own Constitution, defines treaties more narrowly domestically than it does under the
VLCT and international law). But see JANE A. LEGGETT AND RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, CONG. RESEARCH
SERVICE, CLIMATE CHANGE: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE 2015 PARIS AGREEMENT (2016).
14
Paris Agreement regarding the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened
for signature Apr. 22, 2016, T.I.A.S 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris Agreement]; United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Mar. 21, 1994, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
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the nations of the world.15 It was preceded by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the
first treaty enacted by the UNFCCC.16 The Paris Agreement is to some extent
a response to the Kyoto Protocol because it does not impose binding emissions
targets upon the parties. This characteristic served to increase participation,
particularly with respect to reluctant parties such as the United States.17
Instead, the legal structure of the Paris Agreement’s central binding obligation
involves reporting and transparency. Parties are required to submit nationally
determined contributions (“NDCs”) identifying how they will work to meet
the ultimate objective of mitigating climate change.18 The NDCs themselves
are not binding, but are publicly available. Further, once they are submitted,
greenhouse gases contributions, the Cs of NDCs, can only be adjusted
downward, thus increasing the ambition of the commitment to emission
reduction over time. Thus, the NDC mechanism attempts to spark a
“ratcheting” upward of ambition, reinforced through transparency and
ongoing cooperative discussions, ultimately resulting in a global decrease in
emissions.
This NDC mechanism is a “bottom-up” legal obligation because the
target is identified by the nations themselves, as opposed to a top-down
mechanism, such as that found in the Kyoto Protocol, where the agreement
imposed the target. Since each country identifies what they consider
reasonably achievable NDC targets with the Paris Agreement, all parties,
developed and developing, can be covered by a single mechanism that is still
responsive to their different histories and current circumstances.19 In contrast

15

Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris (N.Y. TIMES), Dec. 12, 2015,
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/world/europe/climate-change-accord-paris.html. As of November
2017, the final two holdouts, are Syria and Nicaragua, and the President of the United States intends to
withdraw. See Lisa Friedman, Syria Joins Paris Climate Accord, Leaving Only U.S. Opposed, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/climate/syria-joins-paris-agreement.html?_r=0.
16
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 11.
17
Suzanne Goldenberg, How US negotiators ensured landmark Paris climate deal was Republicanproof, GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/13/climate-changeparis-deal-cop21-obama-administration-congress-republicans-environment (describing strategic positions
taken by the United States during negotiations). Under the Clinton administration, the U.S. initially signed
onto the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. However, the Senate refused to ratify it and the George W. Bush
administration pulled out in 2001. See Julian Borger, Bush kills global warming treaty, GUARDIAN (Mar. 29,
2001), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2001/mar/29/globalwarming.usnews.
18
Bodansky, supra note 13, at 146. The Agreement does not only strive for mitigation. It is the first
of the international instruments to incorporate adaptation, loss, and damage to the climate regime. Id. at 147.
19
Robinson Meyer, A Reader’s Guide to the Paris Agreement, ATLANTIC (Dec. 16, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2015/12/a-readers-guide-to-the-paris-agreement/420345/.
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to this common but differentiated approach to climate change, the Kyoto
Protocol required only developed countries to cut emissions.20
The negotiations leading up to the Paris Agreement aimed to ensure the
treaty would reach nations not party to the Kyoto Agreement, such as the
United States and China.21 Given the reluctance of several parties to submit
to substantively binding emissions targets, the Paris Agreement instead uses
procedural transparency and mutual accountability to drive compliance
through the NDC reporting requirements.22 The NDCs fulfilled the need for
a cooperative mechanism because the determination of compliant national
activities is defined by the parties themselves and, in reporting its NDC, a
party is subject to political and other forms of pressure from member nations.
Since these NDCs are not fixed, it allows for a dynamic response to climate
change issues—party goals can respond to changing information and
technology.
The bottom-up transparent NDC mechanism of the Paris Agreement
echoes the approach of an earlier environmental plan of action, Agenda 21.
Agenda 21 was one of the several agreements produced by world parties at
the third Earth Summit, the United Nations Conference on the Environment
and Development in Rio de Janeiro (“Rio Conference”).23 A primary focus
of the Rio Conference was sustainable development, and Agenda 21 was
developed as a roadmap for moving towards global sustainable
development.24 As a “plan of action,” Agenda 21 occupies a murky area
between treaty and nontreaty.25 It is not a treaty and is not governed by the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Similarly, its strongest legal
language is “should,” rather than “shall,” indicating recommendation rather

20

Kyoto Protocol, supra note 11 (including an Annex listing the countries bound to reduce emissions;
in other words, “Annex countries.”).
21
Id.
22
Bodansky, supra note 13, at 146 (describing the tension between nations over binding NDCs and
the agreed upon strong procedural requirements).
23
U. N. Conference on Environment and Development (1992), WORLD CONF. (May 23, 1997),
http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html. Agreements adopted at the conference include Agenda 21, the
UNFCCC, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the Statement of Forest Principles, and
the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity.
24
UN Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, Preamble UN Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I) (Aug. 13, 1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21].
25
The Paris Agreement, in contrast, is a treaty under the Vienna Convention for the Law of Treaties:
“‘Treaty’ means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and
whatever its particular designation.” VCLT, supra note 13, at art. 2(a).
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than obligation.26 Agenda 21 is in the lineage of general international
environmental agreements and includes some language regarding climate
change. However, Agenda 21 does not directly target emissions reductions
and is not part of the family of treaties that includes the UNFCCC, the Kyoto
Protocol, and the Paris Agreement.
However, intriguingly, Agenda 21 includes language indicating that
states should review their decision-making, “should adopt a national
[sustainable development] strategy,” or NSDS, to further the goal of
sustainability, and “could adopt” indicators of whether this goal has been
reached.27 It also includes reporting and transparency goals.28 These actions
parallel the Paris Agreement’s NDC and reporting mechanisms. Additionally,
they provide a unique opportunity for analyzing the potential for these bottomup transparency mechanisms to increase the effectiveness of an agreement.29
This Comment uses these parallels to investigate the likely
effectiveness of the Paris Agreement. Part II describes the problem of climate
change and identifies the difficulties for the international community in
attacking global commons issues and “super wicked problems.”30 Part III
introduces Agenda 21, describes its structure, and explores national
implementation through the ten-year reports submitted by three countries:
India, the United States, and Zambia. It then analyzes the effectiveness of
Agenda 21 through legal, behavioral, and problem-solving lenses based upon
the analytical categories developed by Daniel Bodansky.31 Bodansky
suggests that the more parties comply with the terms of the agreement, the
more legally effective an agreement is.32 When parties change their normative
behavior in light of the agreement a behaviorally effective agreement arises.33
An agreement that shows problem-solving effectiveness essentially “solves
the problem” that drove its development in the first place.34 Part IV introduces
the Paris Agreement by first situating it within the international legal
26

Bodansky, supra note 13, at 145 (identifying “should” as recommending behavior).
Agenda 21, supra note 24, at ¶¶ 8.3, 8.6, and 8.7.
28
Id. at ¶ 38.
29
Paris Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 8, 38.
30
A “wicked problem” is defined as a policy problem that “defies resolution because of the enormous
interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting stakeholders implicated by any effort to
develop a solution.” Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159. A “super wicked problem,” therefore, is
one with these problematic features plus additional exacerbating attributes.
31
DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART & CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 253–55 (2011).
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
27
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framework for addressing climate change and then explores the NDC and
reporting mechanisms. Finally, Part V, uses the analysis of Agenda 21’s legal,
behavioral, and problem-solving effectiveness to explore the likelihood of
success of the Paris Agreement.
Already, a majority of parties have submitted NDCs in compliance with
the legal obligation of the Paris Agreement.35 A large proportion of parties to
Agenda 21 similarly responded to the reporting recommendations by
submitting reports. This indicates both agreements are legally effective.36
However, it is too early in the life of the Paris Agreement to know whether or
not it will change behavior. The most obvious indication of behavioral
effectiveness will be if parties actually meet their NDCs. Currently, reports
are mixed as to whether they will. Parties to Agenda 21 only moderately
appeared to change behavior as a response to Agenda 21’s reporting
recommendations. However, the targets of Agenda 21 were far less clear.
Thus, the Paris Agreement, because of the clarity of its goal, may see higher
behavioral effectiveness than Agenda 21.
Even if the Paris Agreement demonstrates legal and behavioral
effectiveness, it may still fail to meet the declared temperature target of halting
the mean global temperature increase at 1.5°C, or at least “well below” 2°C
by the end of the century, let alone achieve the “ultimate objective” of the
UNFCCC to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system.37 For Agenda 21, early compliance with reporting aspects did not
predict ultimate success. Agenda 21 did not eradicate poverty or the
environmental degradation arising from development, and therefore, it was
not broadly effective from a problem-solving point of view.38 Currently, if
35

UNFCCC, NDC Registry (Interim), http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/Home.aspx (last
visited Dec. 17, 2017).
36
BODANSKY, supra note 31, at 253.
37
The Paris Agreement aspires to keep global temperature increase from preindustrial times to the end
of the 21st century at or below 1.5°C. Paris Agreement, supra note 13, at art 2. The target of 1.5°C is a shift
downward from the previous 2°C target and is a response to a consensus among the negotiating parties that
1.5 °C increase represents the temperature “tipping-point” above which important climatic variables will shift
outside of the range experienced during human evolution. Adam Vaughn, Paris climate deal: key points at
a glance, GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/12/parisclimate-deal-key-points. Currently, scientists generally consider a 2°C increase to be dangerously high;
however, there is disagreement about whether 1.5 °C is “safe” or is itself too high. Compare Hans Joachim
Schellnhuber et al., Why the right climate target was agreed in Paris, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, 649,
650–51 to James Hansen et al., Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change:” Required Reduction of Carbon
Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations and Nature, 8 PLoS ONE 1, 15 (Dec. 3, 2013),
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0081648&type=printableHansen.
38
BODANSKY, supra note 31, at 253.
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every party to the Paris Agreement met its NDC, the planet would still see a
mean global temperature increase of 3.2°C by the end of the century, breaking
through the 1.5–2.0°C cap articulated in the Paris Agreement, and more than
tripling the 1°C maximum increase many scientists conclude is necessary to
prevent catastrophe.39 The failure of Agenda 21, despite similar initial legal
compliance, raises concerns that the Paris Agreement may similarly fail to
successfully address the broad problem it seeks to solve.
Given the differences between Agenda 21 and the Paris Agreement,
however, there are a few reasons for hope. The results of Agenda 21 indicate
that a pure bottom-up agreement is insufficient to force adjustments in
behavior. However, the Paris Agreement involves more transparency,
stronger standardization, more robust institutional structures at the
international level,40 and a clear impending crisis. These factors may be
sufficient to provide the added push needed to result in behavioral
effectiveness and increasing ambition. Furthermore, climate change has a
known solution, reduce the mean atmospheric concentration of greenhouse
gases, whereas the solutions to poverty and environmental degradation are
subject to dispute. Finally, even if parties to the Paris Agreement fail to cap
the global mean temperature increase at 1.5°C over the next 100 years, any
reduction from the 4°C plus increase projected by “business-as-usual” policies
may be beneficial.41
39

Paris Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 2; Hansen et al., supra note 37, at 15 (noting that a 1°C
average maximum increase will maintain some sea ice, minimizing the worst potential impacts of warming
while a 2°C trajectory is “so dangerous” that it “would be foolhardy”); see, e.g., Umair Irfan, Climate Pledges
Will Fall Short of Needed 2 Degree C Limit, SCI. AM. (Nov. 3, 2016),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/climate-pledges-will-fall-short-of-needed-2-degree-c-limit/
(calculating the projected temperature increase resulting if all current NDC targets are met); CLIMATE
ACTION TRACKER, http://climateactiontracker.org/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (identifying NDCs, calculating
impacts and tracking each country’s progress).
40
While the analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, it is possible that the dedicated secretariat and
regular Conferences of the Parties embedded in the climate treaty regime will support greater effectiveness
of the Paris Agreement than resulted via the Commission of Sustainable Development’s actions in aid of
Agenda 21. For descriptions of the institutional framework for the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement see, e.g.,
UN Climate Change, Background on the UNFCCC: The international response to climate change,
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php (last visited Feb. 3, 2018). In contrast, international
institutional support for Agenda 21 flows to the Commission on Sustainable Development, as called for in
Chapter 38 of the plan. Agenda 21, supra note 24, at Chapter 38.
41
Press Release, World Bank, New Report Examines Risks of 4 Degree Hotter World by End of
Century (Nov. 18, 2012), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2012/11/18/new-reportexamines-risks-of-degree-hotter-world-by-end-of-century (summarizing predicted impacts of a 4°C mean
global temperature increase by the end of the century). Once positive feedback loops are triggered at elevated
mean atmospheric temperatures, however, they may render any benefits from a slight reduction in global
temperature increase (from a projected 4 to an actual 3.5°C) negligible. See, e.g., Hansen et al., supra note
37, at 15 (indicating that mean atmospheric temperature increases higher than 1°C risk catastrophic positive
feedback loops).
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LEGAL STRUGGLE

TO

Climate Change and Its Effects on Natural and Social Systems

Climate change was initially called global warming because it refers to
the climatic effects of an increasing global mean temperature. This
temperature increase results from a rise in the concentration of greenhouse
gases, such as CO2, CH4, and N2O, in the atmosphere.42 If not taken up by
carbon sinks in plants, soil and the ocean, these gases, which are emitted in
mass by anthropogenic industrial activities, interfere with the energy balance
of the earth by trapping heat and increasing mean global surface
temperature.43 As global mean temperature increases, it also triggers positive
feedback loops through thawing permafrost and subsequent methane release,
and a reduction in albedo across the earth’s surface, that, in turn, accelerate
the temperature increase.44 This increase in global mean temperature is
accompanied by increasing ocean acidification as a result of a rise in the
uptake of CO2 by the sea.45 Finally, the rising temperature threatens to
interrupt the oceanic circulatory systems that maintain weather patterns across
the globe.46
42

Fact sheet: Climate change science—the status of climate change science today, UNFCCC (Feb.
2011), https://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/press_factsh_science.pdf (last visited
Nov. 23, 2017) (summarizing climate change causes and impacts). Here, however, this Article uses climate
change to refer to the currently occurring change in climate system arising as a result of human activities.
43
See, e.g., SUSAN SOLOMAN ET AL., TECHNICAL SUMMARY, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL
SCIENCE BASIS CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REP. OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Susan Soloman et al. eds, 2007).
44
Torben R. Christensen et al., Thawing sub-arctic permafrost: Effects on vegetation and methane
emissions, 31 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 1 (2004); James Hansen et al., Ice melt, sea level rise and
superstorms: evidence from paleoclimate data, climate modeling, and modern observations that 2°C global
warming could be dangerous, 16 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS 3761, 3762 (2016); What Are
Carbon Sinks?, FERN, http://www.fern.org/campaign/forests-and-climate/what-are-carbon-sinks (last visited
Feb. 25, 2018) (stating that a “carbon sink is anything that absorbs more carbon than it releases as carbon
dioxide.”); Permafrost, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/permafrost/
(last visited Feb. 14, 2018) (stating that “[p]ermafrost is a permanently frozen layer below the Earths surface.
It consists of soil, gravel, and sand, usually bound together by ice.”); Thermodynamics: Albedo, NAT’L SNOW
AND ICE DATA CENTER, https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/seaice/processes/albedo.html (last visited Feb. 14,
2018) (“Albedo is a non-dimensional, unitless quantity that indicates how well a surface reflects solar energy.
Albedo [] varies between 0 and 1. Albedo commonly refers to the “whiteness” of a surface, with 0 meaning
black and 1 meaning white.”).
45
Ocean Acidification, NOAA, https://www.pmel.noaa.gov/co2/story/Ocean+Acidification (last
visited Dec. 19, 2017).
46
See, e.g., Chelsea Harvey, Scientists say the global ocean circulation may be more vulnerable to
shutdown than we thought, WASH. POST (Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2017/01/04/scientists-say-the-global-ocean-circulation-may-be-more-vulnerable-toshutdown-than-we-thought/?utm_term=.2957bd9e2a3d.
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The greenhouse gases that cause climate change remain in the
atmosphere for decades, or even centuries.47 Thus, the current mean
atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases, at about 400 parts per million
(“ppm”), is the result of the cumulative effect of emissions released
throughout the industrial period, starting at about 1750.48 This increase from
pre-1750 levels of 280 ppm has resulted in an approximately 1.2°C rise in the
global mean temperature as of 2016.49 Furthermore, some greenhouse gases
still have impacts thousands of years after they leave the atmosphere.50 This
means halting emissions entirely today would still not be sufficient to prevent
some level of climate change. It also means the longer the world waits to
address the issue, the harder it will be to solve.51
Part of the problem is that governments respond with vigor only to
those threats that are tangible, such as an attack by hostile agents. Climate
change is not tangible as a unitary phenomenon. It is instead a presence, a
haunting, something interwoven throughout experience.52 A hotter mean
global temperature does not mean that everything is hotter all the time; snow
still forms and people still feel cold.53 Instead, it creates extremes of
temperature on both ends of the spectrum, disrupts hydrogeological systems,
and contributes to more frequent and intense weather events (hurricane,
drought, and flooding) and other disasters, such as massive forest fires.54
47

Duncan Clark & Carbon Brief, How long do greenhouse gases stay in the air? GUARDIAN (Jan. 16,
2012), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/jan/16/greenhouse-gases-remain-air (last visited
Dec. 12, 2017).
48
Press Release, World Meteorological Org., Globally Averaged CO2 Levels Reach 400 parts per
million in 2015 (Oct. 24, 2016), https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/globally-averaged-co2-levelsreach-400-parts-million-2015.
49
WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORG., WMO STATEMENT ON THE STATE OF THE GLOBAL CLIMATE IN
2016 5 (2017), https://library.wmo.int/opac/doc_num.php?explnum_id=3414 (estimating that the mean
global temperature in 2016 was 1.1°C higher than preindustrial times).
50
Justin Gillis, Carbon in Atmosphere is Rising Even as Emissions Stabilize, N.Y. TIMES (June 26,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/climate/carbon-in-atmosphere-is-rising-even-as-emissionsstabilize.html?_r=0.
51
Eric Holthaus, The Point of No Return: Climate Change Nightmares Are Already Here, ROLLING
STONE (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-point-of-no-return-climate-changenightmares-are-already-here-20150805 (discussing current impacts of climate change and comparing them
to predictions); Oliver Milman, Planet has just 5% chance of reaching Paris climate goal, study says,
GUARDIAN (July 31, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jul/31/paris-climate-deal-2cwarming-study (indicating that the world currently has a 5% chance of reaching Paris targets).
52
Apocalypse Now, Jeff van der Meer, ON THE MEDIA (July 6, 2017), https://www.wnyc.org/story/onthe-media-2017-07-07/.
53
Philip Bump, Jim Inhofe’s snowball has disproven climate change once and for all, WASH. POST
(Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/02/26/jim-inhofes-snowball-hasdisproven-climate-change-once-and-for-all/?utm_term=.9c8658f26e10 (describing United States Sen.
Inhofe’s attempt to use a snowball’s existence as proof that climate change is not real).
54
See, e.g., Hansen et al., supra note 37, at 6–9 (describing impacts of climate change).
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Further, it results in increased acidification of the world’s oceans. It even
influences the earth’s crust, potentially leading to more frequent earthquakes
and tsunamis.55 The risk to the world’s population from these global shifts in
weather range from temperature-related mortality, extraordinary disruption
from massive storms, and the loss of homeland.56
These physical shifts disrupt biological systems across the planet.
Species change distribution, abundance, and behavior in response to changes
in temperature.57 These disruptions reinforce the current mass extinction
event, resulting in an even higher loss of species than would be anticipated in
the absence of climate change.58 In concert with weather events, the
increasing acidity of the ocean threatens coral and other taxa by preventing

55

Bill McGuire, How climate change triggers earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanos, GUARDIAN (Oct.
16, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/16/climate-change-triggers-earthquakes-tsunamisvolcanoes.
56
See, e.g., DAVID W. ORR, DOWN TO THE WIRE: CONFRONTING CLIMATE COLLAPSE 74 (Oxford
University Press 2009) (stating that “[t]he effects of our present use of coal, oil, and natural gas will kill into
the far future, but we cannot know exactly who, where, or how they will die. We do know, however, that the
number will be very large and that they will perish in storms, or heat waves, or of strange diseases, or in
violence amplified by famine, or in any of a thousand other ways.”); Kirk R. Smith et al., 2014: Human
health: impacts, adaptation, and co-benefit, in IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY. PART A:
GLOBAL AND SECTORAL ASPECTS CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT
OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 709, 716–33 (C.B. Field et al. eds., 2014)
(discussing extensively impacts of climate change on human health and welfare); Samantha Andoot & Susan
Pachelo, Global Climate Change and Children’s Health, 136 PEDIATRICS 992, 993–94 (2015) (identifying
negatives impacts on children of climate change); Ives, supra note 6; Anthony J. McMichael, Globalization,
Climate Change, and Human Health. 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1335, 1340 (2013) (enumerating health impacts
of warming climate ranging from increased disease to respiratory ailments).
57
Jorge García Molinos et al., Climate velocity and the future global redistribution of marine
biodiversity, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 83, 85–87 (2015) (modeling extinction and massive changes in
community composition of marine systems predicted to result from climate change); J. F. MacLaughlin et
al., Climate change hastens population extinctions, 99 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., 6070, 6074 (2002)
(discussing interactions of climate-change-caused factors that lead to population, and subsequently species,
extinction); W. Thuiller et al., Consequences of climate change on the tree of life in Europe, 470 NATURE
531, 534 (2011) (predicting a decrease in biodiversity in Europe as a result of changes in distributions
resulting from climate change); Bob B. M. Wong & Ulrika Candolin, Behavioral responses to changing
environments, 26 BEHAV. ECOLOGY 665, 667–69 (2015) (discussing behavioral and distribution currently
occurring as a result of climate change and identifying the potential for change in the future).
58
Gerardo Ceballos et al., Biological annihilation via the ongoing sixth mass extinction signaled by
vertebrate population losses and declines, 114 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., E6089, E6095 (2017)
(indicating a primary cause of faunal declines as being climate destabilization and its interaction with other
factors); Tatiana Schlossberg, Era of ‘Biological Annihilation’ Is Underway, Scientists Warn, N.Y. TIMES,
July 11, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/11/climate/mass-extinction-animal-species.html?_r=0
(noting that climate change is “exacerbating” extinction rates); Damian Carrington, Earth’s sixth mass
extinction
event
under
way,
scientists
warn,
GUARDIAN
(July
10,
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jul/10/earths-sixth-mass-extinction-event-alreadyunderway-scientists-warn (including climate change in the list of causes of the current mass extinction).
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calcification of exoskeletons and support structures.59 At the same time,
species across the globe vanish and disease-causing organisms and their
vectors thrive, leading to an increased risk of epidemic in human and nonhuman organisms alike.60 The loss and degradation of other species threatens
the world’s food supply and the health of humans, and reinforces the threat to
declining species themselves. The result of this massive disruption is not only
direct mortality and injury, but also threat multiplication and an increase in
global conflict.61 The increase in extreme weather events, the disruption and
displacement from climatic impacts, the loss of biodiversity, and the
associated anxiety, negatively affect the world’s population both spiritually
and emotionally.62
The United Nations Environmental Program and the World
Meteorological Organization, recognizing that climate change posed a threat,
created the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) in 1988, in
order to pool scientific efforts to record and predict climate change and its
impacts and to identify mitigation and adaptation strategies.63 In 2014, the
IPCC released its fifth report, “Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation,
and Vulnerability.”64 By shifting from a focus on mitigation to a focus on
59

See, e.g., Andrea Y. Frommel et al., Ocean Acidification has Lethal and Sub-Lethal Effects on
Larval Development of Yellowfin Tuna Thunnus Albacares, 482 EXPERIMENTAL MARINE BIOLOGY &
ECOLOGY 18, 18, 23 (2016) (identifying negative impacts of ocean acidification on larval development);
Kristy J. Kroeker et al., Meta-Analysis Reveals Negative Yet Variable Effects of Ocean Acidification on
Marine Organisms, 13 ECOLOGY LETTERS 1419, 1419 (2010) (demonstrating negative effects across marine
organisms from acidification).
60
Matthew C. Fisher et al., Emerging fungal threats to animal, plant and ecosystem health, 484
NATURE 186, 191 (2012) (discussing recent increase in fungal epidemics and their relationship to climate
shifts); Climate change and human health: risks and responses, Summary: Climate change and infectious
diseases, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2003), http://www.who.int/globalchange/climate/summary/en/index5.html
(summarizing expected increases in disease in humans as a result of climate change).
61
Dana Nuccitelli, NATO joins the Pentagon in deeming climate change a threat multiplier, BULL.
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (May 25, 2017), https://thebulletin.org/nato-joins-pentagon-deeming-climate-changethreat-multiplier10790 (noting that reports from both NATO and the United States Defense Department view
climate change as an exacerbating factor in undermining peace and stability across the globe).
62
See, e.g., Glenn Albrecht et al., Solastalgia: the distress caused by environmental change, 15 AUSTL.
PSYCHIATRY S95, S95–98 (2007) (introducing the term “solastagia” as a way to describe the loss of the solace
of one’s environment through factors such as climate change); Andoot & Pacheco, supra note 56, at 993–94
(identifying negative impacts on cognitive development of children from climate change); François Bourque
& Ashlee Cunsolo Willox, Climate change: The next challenge for public mental health?, 26 INT’L REV. OF
PSYCHIATRY 415, 416–19 (2014) (discussing the relationship between climate change and mental health);
Cameron Harrington, The Ends of the World: International Relations and the Anthropocene, 44 MILLENNIUM
J. OF INT’L STUD. 478, 480–81 (2016) (indicating the political, ethical, and social impacts of climate change
and other Anthropocene phenomena).
63
Organization, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://www.ipcc.ch/
organization/organization.shtml (last visited Nov. 23, 2017).
64
See Activities: Fifth Assessment Report, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://ipcc.ch/activities/activities.shtml (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).
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adaptation and vulnerability, the IPCC made clear that, by 2014, climate
change impacts were no longer potentially occurring, they were undeniable.
As the IPCC and other such reports indicate, people across the globe
are experiencing the nascent effects of climatic destabilization.65 These
effects include drought, induced starvation, and migration in Central America,
loss of home and life through catastrophic storms and wildfires in the United
States, Europe, and the Caribbean, and illness and death from respiratory
stress and extreme temperatures such as heatwaves across the globe.66 At
present, the world community, particularly the big three emitters, the United
States, China, and India, can still act to prevent the worst climate change
impacts. However, even now, climate change is no longer fully reversible,
and the longer the world waits, the less chance there is to halt its most
catastrophic effects.
B.

The Difficulty of Addressing Climate Change Legally

The law is built to address situations where the cause and the harm are
sufficiently linked in time and space, such that the cost is (relatively) easy to
calculate and the redress is localized. In contrast, the injury of climate change
is dislocated in time and space from its cause. The molecule of CO2 emitted
by a car driven in Seattle in 2017 might impact sea levels on Kirabati’s shores
the following year.67 The same molecule might also increase the severity of
65
AAAS Board Statement on Climate Change, AM. ASS’N ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., (Dec. 6, 2006),
http://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/migrate/uploads/aaas_climate_statement.pdf
(“The
scientific
evidence is clear: global climate change caused by human activities is occurring now, and it is a growing
threat to society.”).
66
Damian Carrington, Climate change already bringing disease, air pollution and heatwaves,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/oct/30/climate-changealready-damaging-health-of-millions-globally-report-finds; see also Niraj Chokshi & Maggie Astor,
Hurricane Harvey: The Devastation and What Comes Next, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/28/us/hurricane-harvey-texas.html?; Stephanie Leutert, Climate ChangeInduced Migration from Central America, LAWFARE BLOG (June 21, 2017, 10:30 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/climate-change-induced-migration-central-america; Fraces Robles et al.,
Official Toll in Puerto Rico: 64. Actual deaths May be 1,052, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/08/us/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-death-toll.html;
Scott
Wilson et al., Ferocious wildfires ravage Southern California, evacuating communities and destroying
homes, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ post-nation/wp/2017/12/06/
ferocious-wildfires-burn-across-southern-california-destroying-homes-and-forcing-thousands-to-evacuate/?
utm_term=e65293bf9d26; Central America: Drought—2014-2017, RELIEF WEB DISASTERS,
https://reliefweb.int/ disaster/dr-2014-000132-hnd (last visited Dec. 26, 2017); see also Nick Watts et al.,
The Lancet Countdown: tracking progress on health and climate change, 381 LANCET 1151 (2017).
67
Ada Carr, Kiribati Developing Plans to Fight Against Climate Change, Rising Seas, WEATHER
CHANNEL (Nov. 22, 2017), https://weather.com/news/news/2017-11-22-kiribati-climate-change-threatdevelopments (describing impact of rising seas on Kiribati).
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a forest fire in the mountains east of Seattle in 2217. Thus, that single
molecule will result in harm far, both in space and time, from its original site
of emission. Furthermore, the nation bearing the cost of refraining from
emitting these gases does not receive a proportional share of the benefits of
reduced impacts of climate change. For example, while developed countries,
particularly the United States,68 have contributed significantly more
greenhouse gases to the atmosphere, developing countries, such as Chad, are
most vulnerable to the effects of climate change.69 This disconnect between
cause and effect, “the physical spillover” both geographically and temporally,
makes resolving global commons issues difficult.
The geographical range and complex dynamics of these problems arise
out of their impact on the global commons—resources such as the ocean and
atmosphere—that are out of “the political reach of any one nation state.”70
International law struggles to address the geographical reach of environmental
commons issues that stretch across the globe. It fails to touch the vast
temporal dislocation of climate change where current actions will harm
populations occupying the planet centuries from now.71
One type of treaty strategy to deal with global commons issues is to
address the commons element itself. For example, the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) creates a jurisdictional
framework and enforcement mechanism for the ocean, while similarly
identifying the global responsibility for it as a commons.72 A second approach
68
Makiko Sato & James Hansen, Fossil Fuel CO2 Emissions, http://www.columbia.edu/~mhs119/
CO2Emissions/Emis_moreFigs/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2017) (showing that the U.S. is responsible for 25% of
the world’s historic emissions from 1751–2013).
69
See Hakim Abdi, Where is the most vulnerable country to climate change? CLIMATE CHANGE NEWS
(June 13, 2017), http://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/06/13/vulnerable-country-climate-change/
(identifying a recent study that rated Chad as the country most vulnerable to climate change); see also Adel
Daoud et al., What is the Association between Absolute Child Poverty, Poor Governance, and Natural
Disasters? A Global Comparison of Some of the Realities of Climate Change, 11 PLOS ONE 1, 16 (2016)
(finding that “natural disasters victimization correlates with increasing rates of child poverty”); Luke J.
Harrington et al., Poorest Countries Experience Earlier Anthropogenic Emergence of Daily Temperature
Extremes, 11 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 7 (2016) (noting “if cumulative emissions continue to increase at
current rates, the impacts, in terms of frequency of heat extremes, will become significantly worse for poorer
nations when compared with their wealthier counterparts.”).
70
CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING?: LAW, MORALITY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 126 (2010).
71
See, e.g., David A. Weisbach & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Discounting the Future: A
Guide for the Perplexed, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 433, 434–35 (2009) (discussing the “cost discounting”
approach to policy, whereby in cost-benefit analysis, costs distant in the future are discounted relative to
those occurring more immediately).
72
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Overview, UN, http://www.un.org/depts/los/
convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm (last updated May 4, 2017).
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is to address a specific type of harm to commons, such as depletion of the
ozone layer, and produce a multilateral treaty specifically targeting the
sources causing that harm. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer (“Montreal Protocol”) is an example of this type of treaty.73
Both UNCLOS and the Montreal Protocol address issues that spillover across
national boundaries. Both also have moderate to high reported compliance
levels.74 The Montreal Protocol has even proven to be flexible enough to
incorporate novel restrictions related to climate change mitigation.75
Climate change involves the commons issues covered by both
UNCLOS and the Montreal Protocol: the ocean and the atmosphere.
However, the complicated nature of climate change, where the cause includes
a number of molecular components of carbon emissions and the impacts affect
all commons issues, requires a different sort of treaty than either of these
international agreements. In addition, the painful choices necessary to
adequately deal with the problem mean leaders must risk their political
position, particularly in democratic governments, by embracing unpalatable
decisions. For example, one of the IPCC’s “stringent” analytical scenarios,
Representative Carbon Pathway 2.6 (“RP2.6”), mandates carbon cuts in the
future akin to the decreases seen in modern history only during times of
economic collapse, such as during the Great Depression of the 1930s.76 This
potentially requires a curtailment of developed economies and a willingness
to forgo development, or at least industrialize along a different trajectory, in
developing economies.77 Finally, the addition of the component of deep
temporal spillover renders climate change a “super wicked problem.”78 There
73

The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, UNEP OZONE SECRETARIAT,
http://ozone.unep.org/en/treaties-and-decisions/montreal-protocol-substances-deplete-ozone-layer
(last
visited Oct. 7, 2017).
74
See, e.g., Stephen Leahy, Without the Ozone Treaty You’d Get Sunburned in 5 Minutes, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, Sept. 25, 2017, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/09/ montreal-protocol-ozonetreaty-30-climate-change-hcfs-hfcs/ (describing the Montreal Protocol).
75
Mohamed Atani, The Kigali Amendment to The Montreal Protocol: Another Global Commitment
to Stop Climate Change, U.N. ENV’T (Dec. 8, 2016), http://www.unep.org/africa/news/kigali-amendmentmontreal-protocol-another-global-commitment-stop-climate-change.
76
See Damian Carrington, Ambitious 1.5C Paris Climate Target is Still Possible, New Analysis Shows,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/sep/18/ambitious-15c-parisclimate-target-is-still-possible-new-analysis-shows (describing the requirements of RCP 2.6); GP Wayne,
Now Available: A Guide to The IPCC’s New RCP Emissions Pathways, GUARDIAN (Aug. 30, 2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2013/aug/30/climate-changercp-handy-summary (sketching the various Representative Carbon Pathways, including RCP2.6).
77
But see Mark Z. Jacobson et. al., Roadmaps to Transition Countries to 100% Clean, Renewable
Energy for All Purposes to Curtail Global Warming, Air Pollution, and Energy Risk, 5 EARTH’S FUTURE
948, 948, 951 (2017) (positing a potential pathway to mitigating climate change that does not necessarily
require a halt to all development).
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Lazarus, supra note 30, at 1153, 1159.
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is no clear framework in existence to successfully “develop, implement and
maintain the laws necessary” to combat climate change.79
On top of this, the transcendence by climate change of time and space,
as well as its “haunting” nature, means that people, both the populace and its
leaders, fail to fully grasp the existence and threat of climate change.80 Parties
struggle to understand the immensity of the danger. A threat that is so diffused
and scattered in time and space is much harder to experience than something
immediate and targeted such as nuclear saber rattling.81 Thus, because they
and their people cannot fully understand the threat, governments continue to
balance ongoing, increasing, and often underestimated risks of climate change
against immediate economic impacts. This results in decisions that favor
immediate economic concerns rather than much greater long-term economic
costs.82
Ultimately, acting on climate change requires a global commitment. It
requires the developed world to accept its responsibility and the risks to which
it continues to subject the world with excessive emissions. It requires
developing countries, such as India, to accept that developing in the same
manner as the United States will doom the world and its own citizens to a far
less hospitable future.
III.

AGENDA 21: ITS STRUCTURE, IMPLEMENTATION, AND EFFECTIVENESS

The goal of Agenda 21 is sustainable development, or the attempt to
harness resources for present day populations in a manner that ensures future
generations will also have access to sufficient resources. Agenda 21 includes
“the atmosphere” as an element to consider in sustainable development, along
with pollution, poverty, and economic development.83 It is a framework for
79

Id. at 1160–62.
ORR, supra note 56, at 74 (noting that we don’t even have a word to describe this calamity). Timothy
Morton calls climate change a “hyperobject,” one that that is so vast temporally and spatially that we cannot
conceive of them within the structure of traditional thought. See generally TIMOTHY MORTON,
HYPEROBJECTS: PHIL. & ECOLOGY AFTER THE END OF THE WORLD (2013).
81
See, e.g., ‘Massive military response’ if N Korea fires nukes: US, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 28, 2017),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/military-response-korea-fires-nukes-171028074343644.html
(quoting U.S. Secretary of Defense, Jim Mattis’s response to questions about potential nuclear conflict).
82
Stephen Leahy, Hidden Costs of Climate Change Running Hundreds of Billions a Year, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (Sept. 27, 2017), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/09/climate-change-costsus-economy-billions-report/ (describing the recent report calculating costs of climate change impacts to the
U.S. of at least $240 billion per year for the past ten years).
83
Rep. of the World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future. U.N. Doc.
A/42/427, at 43 (1987) [hereinafter Brundtland Rep.] (defining sustainable development as “development
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economic development rather than an attack directly on global commons
problems. Global commons such as the atmosphere are considered within the
text of Agenda 21.84 However, rather than directly identifying specific goals
for a commons problem, such as ozone pollution, Agenda 21 indicates that
parties should include consideration of means for pollution reduction in policy
approaches.85 That said, similar to agreements targeting global commons
issues, sustainable development action requires multiple governmental parties
willing to sacrifice immediate economic rewards for future benefits. Agenda
21 explicitly states in its preamble that there is a need for global collaboration
for sustainable development, noting “[n]o nation can achieve this on its own;
but together we can—in a global partnership for sustainable development.”86
Below this Comment describes, briefly, the process that led to Agenda
21. It then describes Agenda 21’s legal structure, focusing on Chapter 8 and
Chapter 38 in particular, as they provide the basis for the national inventory
and reporting. This Comment provides examples of the implementation of
these chapters from three countries: India, the United States, and Zambia.
Finally, it evaluates the legal effectiveness of Agenda 21.
A.

The Origin of Agenda 21

Agenda 21 emerged out of the Rio Conference at the same time as the
UNFCCC, the Rio Declaration, and several other important environmental
agreements.87 At this conference, sustainable development and conservation
was placed at the forefront of global policy. This foregrounding of sustainable
development occurred as it was becoming clear that development without
consideration for sustainability, poverty, and the environment was harmful.88
Its goal was to integrate sustainable development into developmental
processes via national plans coordinated across parties through a “new global
partnership.”89
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs.”).
84
Agenda 21, supra note 24, at ¶ 9.1–9.35.
85
Id.
86
Id. at ¶ 1.1.
87
Apart from Agenda 21 and the UNFCCC, agreements included the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, the Statement of Forest Principles, and the United Nations Convention on Biological
Diversity.
88
The term “sustainable development” is identified by the Oxford English Dictionary as first
appearing in 1972. Sustainable development, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. Mar. 2012).
89
Agenda 21, supra note 24 at ¶¶ 1.3, 2.1. Agenda 21 is a sister instrument to the Rio Declaration,
providing the extensive analysis and suggestions for structural implementation of the principles of the Rio
Declaration. Ben Boer, Institutionalizing Ecologically Sustainable Development: The Roles of National,
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The 1972 Conference on the Human Environment, in Stockholm, was
the first time the United Nations (“UN”) focused specifically on
environmental health.90 In 1983, the U.N. convened the United Nations
World Commission on Environment and Development to respond to growing
concerns about rates of development, increasing poverty, and negative
impacts on the environment.91 In 1987, the commission presented Our
Common Future, also known as the Brundtland Report.92 The strongly
worded Brundtland Report recognized that development without regard for
environmental harms created, at times, “life-threatening hazards.”93
According to the report, “[t]his new reality, from which there is no escape,
must be recognized and managed.”94 The report was ultimately aimed at
identifying how the international community might start to address these
problems. It called for “decisive political action to begin managing
environmental resources.”95
The General Assembly Resolution 44/228 of December 1989 followed
and called for a more integrated approach to development and the
environment.96 This resolution ultimately resulted in Agenda 21. The
Conference Security General, Maurice Strong, called Rio a “‘historic moment
for humanity.’” He indicated that “[a]lthough Agenda 21 had been weakened
by compromise and negotiation . . . it was still the most comprehensive and,
if implemented, effective program[] of action ever sanctioned by the
international community.”97 Thus, while Agenda 21 still aimed for the
Brundtland Report’s hope of “a new era of economic growth, one that must
be based on policies that sustain and expand the environmental resource base
. . . [and] relieve the great poverty that is deepening in much of the developing
world,” it did not impose any obligations on parties to actually implement
these policies.98 The resulting agreement is an action plan for sustainable
State, and Local Governments in Translating Grand Strategy in to Action, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 307, 314
(1995).
90
Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment
(Stockholm
Conference),
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/milestones/
humanenvironment (last visited Feb. 3, 2018). See also Richard Black, Stockholm: Birth of the green
generation, BBC News (June 4, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-18315205.
91
Brundtland Rep, supra note 83 (describing the creation of the commission and subsequent
publication of the Bruntland Report).
92
Id. at 43.
93
Id. at IV(1).
94
Id.
95
Id. at IV(4).
96
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97
UNCED, supra note 23.
98
Brundtland Rep., supra note 83, at IV(3).
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development and, as such, it is nonbinding, or “soft-law.”99 It suggests, but
does not oblige, signatories to take particular actions.
The text of Agenda 21 asserts that integrating environmental and
development concerns into all levels of government will result in satisfaction
of “basic needs, improved living standards for all, better protected and
managed ecosystems, and a safer, more prosperous future.”100 Agenda 21 thus
broadly mandates integrating an evaluation of environmental and economic
effects across development decisions. It is therefore more of an attempt at
cooperative norm-building than a rationalist approach to lawmaking, where
deterrence is often a large component of the regime.101 The effectiveness of
this approach requires governments to make behavioral adjustments such that
decisions are made with the idea of sustainability as a default to a sort of norm
of law.102 These cooperative agreements work because parties want to comply
to be in good standing with other countries.103 While Agenda 21 lacked
obvious teeth, this by no means assured that it would fail to shift signatories’
behavior. As an international plan, it was enacted consistent with the principle
of pacta sunt servanda, which indicates that parties to international plans and
agreements should negotiate in good faith.104 Thus, Agenda 21 was enacted
with the expectation that parties would do their best to respond to its guidance,
creating what may be viewed as a political commitment, while at the same
time not resulting in any sort of legal obligation.105
B.

The Structure of Agenda 21: Chapters 8 and 38

Agenda 21 and Chapters 8 and 38 focus on creating general
recommendations for action at the national level and a structure to report these

99
See, e.g., Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, EISIL,
http://www.eisil.org/index.php?sid=500461557&id=620&t=link_details&cat=0&having=342305
(last
visited Dec. 19, 2017) (describing, briefly, Agenda 21).
100
Agenda 21, supra note 24, at ¶ 1.1.
101
See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32
Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 387, 404–09 (2000) (describing norm driven approaches to international agreements).
102
Id.; see also OONA HATHAWAY & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
& POLITICS 2–3 (2004).
103
Raustiala, supra note 101, at 404–09.
104
Roughly, “agreements must be kept.” Pacta sunt servanda, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed.
Mar. 2012); see also, Pacta Sunt Servanda, INT’L JUD. MONITOR (Sept. 2008) http://www.judicialmonitor.
org/archive_0908/generalprinciples.html.
105
Agenda 21, supra note 24, at Preamble ¶ 3 (noting that Agenda 21 “reflects a global consensus and
political commitment.”).
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actions.106 Chapter 8 aims for “progressive integration of environmental and
developmental issues” across all levels of national governance.107 Chapter 38
calls for the creation of the Commission on Sustainable Development
(“CSD”) as an international body focused on facilitating reporting and other
aspects of Agenda 21.108
Chapter 8 proposes States “strengthen institutional structures to allow
the full integration of environmental and developmental issues.”109 It calls for
national reviews of “economic, sectoral and environmental policies, strategies
and plans to ensure the progressive integration of environmental and
developmental issues,”110 and the establishment of “domestically determined
procedures to integrate environment and development issues in decisionmaking.”111 These “objectives,” while fairly direct, are to be taken through
“countries . . . develop[ing] their own priorities in accordance with their
prevailing conditions.”112 Thus, at the outset, States have full discretion in the
shape, form, and outcome of their national review and domestically
determined procedures, provided they can argue that environmental and
socio-economic issues are considered.
Section 8.4 more specifically indicates activities to move governments
toward sustainable development considerations in decision-making. It states
that “[g]overnments should conduct a national review and, where appropriate,
improve the processes of decision-making.”113 “Should,” as used here, is the
language of legal recommendation.114 This section thus urges, but does not
compel, States to review their own structures for decision-making and adopt
a “domestically formulated policy framework” to better achieve the goals of
progressively integrating environmental and development concerns.115 It
indicates that “[c]ountries will develop their own priorities in accordance with
[their own] national plans, policies and program[]s.”116 The term “will” does
not rise to the level of obligation that is true of the term “shall,” but rather is
106
Id. at ¶¶ 8.1–8.54, 38.1–38.45. Integrating environment and development in decision-making, 38
International Institutional Arrangements. Agenda 21 is comprised of four sections and 40 chapters total.
Chapter 8 is in Sec. 1 and Chapter 38 is in Sec. 5.
107
Id. at ¶¶ 8.2, 8.3.
108
Id. at ¶ 38.11.
109
Id. at ¶ 8.3(b).
110
Id. at ¶ 8.3(a).
111
Id. at ¶ 8.3(d).
112
Id. at ¶¶ 8.2, 8.3.
113
Id. at ¶ 8.4.
114
Bodansky, supra note 13, at 145 (identifying “should” as recommending behavior).
115
Agenda 21, supra note 24, at ¶ 8.4(b).
116
Id. at ¶ 8.4.
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a term of expectation.117 It is further qualified here by the discretionary “in
accordance with” the specific constraints of the particular country.118 The
plan, therefore, does not prescribe particular state targets or approaches, but
rather indicates that the states themselves have full latitude in designing,
developing, and implementing sustainable development policies. Thus, the
plan employs a “bottom-up” rather than a “top-down” approach.119
Section 8.7 states that governments “should adopt a national strategy
for sustainable development based on, inter alia, the implementation of
decisions taken at the Conference, particularly with respect to Agenda 21.”120
This action is to be country-specific, although international organizations
might cooperate to create a “country-driven sustainable development
strategy.”121 The ultimate goal “should be to ensure socially responsible
economic development while protecting the resource base and the
environment for the benefit of future generations.”122
Chapter 38 creates the CSD and identifies its role in collating and
analyzing reports from parties. More specifically, Section 38.13(b) notes that
“[t]he Commission on Sustainable Development should have the following
functions . . . [such as to] . . . consider information provided by Governments
including, for example, information in the form of periodic communications
or national reports.”123 Paragraph 38.38 further notes that “States could
consider the preparation of national reports . . . Countries could also consider
the preparation of national action plans for the implementation of Agenda
21.”124
In 1997, the international community agreed on a plan to further
implement Agenda 21. This plan recommended all States create National
Sustainable Development Strategies (“NSDSs”) by 2002, as identified
originally in Chapter 8.7.125 The plan, as adopted by the General Assembly,
117

Bodansky, supra note 13, at 145 (indicating that “will” can serve as expectation).
Agenda 21, supra note 24, at ¶ 8.4.
119
See, e.g., BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 11, at 13, 351 (defining “bottom-up” agreements).
120
Agenda 21, supra note 24, at ¶ 8.7.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. at ¶ 38.13(b).
124
Id. at ¶ 38.38.
125
G.A. Res. A/RES/S-19/2, Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21, at ¶ 24(a) (Sept.
19, 1997) [hereinafter Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21]; see also John C. Dernbach,
Chapter 32: National Governance, in 723 STUMBLING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY (John C. Dernbach ed.,
2002) (describing the process of the resolution). The push for submitting NSDSs resulted, in part, from the
118
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also reiterates the language of Agenda 21, Chapter 38 in suggesting that
“countries may wish to submit to the Commission, on a voluntary basis,
information regarding their efforts to incorporate the relevant
recommendations of other United Nations conferences in national sustainable
development strategies.”126 Agenda 21 in Chapter 8, 38 and through the plan
for further implementations indicates that national implementation should
occur through self-evaluation, identification of areas for improvement,
creation of a general strategy, or NSDS.
C.

The Implementation of Agenda 21

The national reports standardized and made public by the CSD indicate
how individual parties implemented Agenda 21.127 They therefore provide
some evidence for its effectiveness. Similarly, the proportion of countries
reporting and the evaluation of the reporting experience provide evidence
specifically about the impact of the reporting aspects of both Chapters 8 and
38.
For the purposes of this analysis, this Comment looks to reports
prepared for the ten-year follow up conference, the World Summit on
Sustainable Development (“Earth Summit”) in 2002.128 Specifically, this
Comment summarizes reports produced for three nations: India, the United
States, and Zambia.129 For the most part, these reports, within each country,
issues raised in the 1996 report of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”).
Id. at 725; see OECD, SHAPING THE 21ST CENTURY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF DEV. CO-OPERATION 10 (1996).
126
Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21, supra note 125, at ¶ 133(b).
127
See, e.g., U.N., India Country Profile, Johannesburg Summit 2002, at 111 (2002),
http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/wssd/india.pdf (identifying legal pathways of implementation)
[hereinafter India Country Profile]; BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 11, at 212–18 (indicating that
implementation of international agreements at the national level involves executive/administrative,
legislative and judicial approaches); see, e.g., CSD, Institutional Aspects of Sustainable Development in
Mexico (Apr. 1999), http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/countr/mexico/inst.htm. See John C.
Dernbach, Reflections on Comparative Law, Environmental Law, and Sustainability, 2 WIDENER L. SYMP. J.
279, 282 (1998) (identifying this effort towards reporting standardization). The “Institutional” section of
these indicators contains identification of national decision-making structures as called for by Chapter 8.
128
At this conference, world leaders and representatives of nongovernmental organizations gathered in
Johannesburg to review progress in attaining sustainable development goals, and to identify how achievement
of these goals might be furthered through structural and other changes. U.N. Background Release
ENV/DEV/J/1 (Aug. 24, 2002), http://www.un.org/events/wssd/summaries/envdevj1.htm.
129
I selected these countries for the following reasons. First, I looked for industrialized and
industrializing nations to compare. I started with India because it identified judicial as well as executive and
legislative actions which was unusual. Furthermore, India faces challenges both in its environment and in its
level of poverty. It is estimated that approximately one-third of the people living in extreme poverty reside
in India. Nilanjana Bhowmick, India is Home to More Poor People Than Anywhere Else on Earth, TIME
(July 17, 2014), http://time.com/2999550/india-home-to-most-poor-people/. As a comparison, the United
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identify systems in place prior to Agenda 21, with some examples of
legislative and executive/administrative actions taken in response to the
agreement. Agenda 21 is not a treaty and countries therefore do not enact it
directly as enforceable law. Rather, it aims to shift more general policies and
decision making about development. That said, Agenda 21 does indicate that
countries should include a means for judicial remedying of actions that impact
the environment and development.130 Some countries, such as India, include
a discussion of judicial proceedings in the report.131 The countries differ in
their interpretation of what integrating sustainable development into decisionmaking looks like. For India and Zambia, sustainable development primarily
involves including environmental considerations in decision-making, whereas
for the United States, it involves weighing economic and environmental
factors against each other.
1.

India’s Ten-Year Report

India’s report focuses on including environmental considerations
across decision-making processes. It indicates that Agenda 21 is consistent
with India’s long-time integration of environmental considerations into
political decisions.132 India identifies the National Environmental Council as
a high-level coordinating body and the country’s Five-Year Plans as important
policy statements of primary importance to the incorporation of sustainable
development considerations nationally.133 The report notes that targets were
States is the poster-child for industrialization and overconsumption. See, e.g. AM. ASS’N FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., Natural Resources: Introduction, POPULATION & NAT. RES., ATLAS OF POPULATION
& ENV’T, http://atlas.aaas.org/index.php?part=2 (last visited Dec. 4, 2017). Both India and the United States
wield power on the global stage and there is often a tension between India and the United States in negotiating
international environmental agreements. See, e.g., T.P. Sreenivasan, Cool down the rhetoric, HINDU (May
22, 2017), http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/cool-down-the-rhetoric/article18519996.ece (noting that
negotiations at Rio reached a “fine balance struck by India and the U.S. [that] culminated in the Agenda
21.”); see also Ben Westcott, Reluctant signatory India takes moral high-ground on Paris climate deal, CNN
(June 2, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/02/asia/india-paris-agreement-trump/index.html (describing
President Modi of India’s response to President Trump’s announcement that the U.S. would withdraw from
Paris Agreement). In contrast, Zambia does not hold the same negotiating power on the global stage and is
considered by the United Nations to be a “least developed country,” with substantial natural resources and
challenges in development that are not reflected in the concerns of the U.S. or India. See, e.g. Ruth Gordan,
Unsustainable Development, in INT’L ENVTL. LAW & THE GLOBAL S. (Shawkat Alam, Sumudu Atapattu,
Carmen G. Gonzalez & Jona Razzaque eds., 2015) 50, 50–73.
130
Agenda 21, supra note 24, at ¶¶ 8.17(b), 8.18.
131
CSD, Institutional Aspects of Sustainable Development in India (Apr. 1, 1997),
http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/countr/india/inst.htm.
132
India Country Profile, supra note 127; see also GOV’T OF INDIA, THE MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT,
FOREST AND CLIMATE CHANGE, Agenda 21 — An Assessment, Chapter 2, 23. (2002), http://envfor.nic.in/
content/agenda-21-assessment.
133
India Country Profile, supra note 127, at 41.
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incorporated into the Tenth Five-Year Plan, which starts the year of the Earth
Summit, that are consistent with sustainable development goals.134
India identifies additional policy statements consistent with sustainable
development, including the National Conservation Strategy and Policy
Statement on the Environment, the Policy Statement for Abatement of
Pollution, and the National Conservation and Policy Statement on
Environment and Development.135 The report notes that an Environment
Action Program was developed in 1993 to include environmental
considerations in development decisions.136 At the time of the report, India’s
NSDS was in the final stages leading up to adoption.137
The report includes an extensive list of legislative and regulatory
actions consistent with integrating environmental considerations into
decision-making.138 Legislative actions identified in the report include the
New Biodiversity Bill and the National Environment Tribunal Act.139
Regulatory actions include the Hazardous Wastes (“Management and
Handling”) Rules and the Prevention and Control of Pollution (Informed
Consent Procedure) Rules.140 To demonstrate India’s commitment to using
legal structures to protect the environment, a National Appellate Authority
was created in 1997 to address appeals from proposals restricted or rejected
by the government because of potential harmful environmental impacts.141
The report also notes that India had made progress setting up the hardware
and software tools to track implementation of sustainability ideas into
governmental decision-making.142
134

The goals include: “Reduction of: poverty ratio by 5% by 2007 and by 15% by 2012; gender gaps
in literacy and wage rates by at least 50% by 2007; the decadal rate of population growth between 2001 and
2011 to 16.2%; Infant mortality rate (IMR) to 45 per 1000 live births by 2007 and to 28 by 2012; and,
Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) to 2 per 1000 live births by 2007 and to 1 by 2012; Provision of gainful
high- quality employment to the addition to the labor force over the Tenth Plan period; Increase in Literacy
rate to 75 % within the Plan period; All children in school by 2003; all children to complete 5 years of
schooling by 2007; Increase in forest and tree cover to 25% by 2007 and 33% by 2012; All villages to have
sustained access to potable drinking water within the Plan period; and, Cleaning of major polluted rivers by
2007 and other notified stretches by 2012.” Id.
135
Id.
136
GOV’T OF INDIA, supra note 132, at 24.
137
India Country Profile, supra note 127.
138
Id. at 42–43, 126–27.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. The Appellate Court was replaced by a National Green Tribunal in 2010. See Wendy Zeldin,
India: New Green Tribunal Established, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR, Jan. 6, 2011,
http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/india-new-green-tribunal-established/.
142
India Country Profile, supra note 127.
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The report indicates areas for improvement, include expanding
analytical approaches as well as increased enforcement and performance
evaluation.143 For example, the report identifies the Environmental Impact
Assessment (“EIA”) as an appropriate analytical tool for expansion, although
it is already a statutory requirement for several development activities.144
The judiciary, according to the report, has an increasing role in
environmental protection in India.145 One case directly discusses Agenda 21:
Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India & Ors 2. In this case, the
court ordered the government to address pollution from tanneries in Tamil
Nadu. The court used the “precautionary principle,” which requires that, in
the absence of scientific certainty regarding the harm from pollution, the
government needs to err on the side of caution.146 It also raised the principle
of “polluter pays,” indicating that polluters must bear the cost of managing
pollution to prevent harms to human health and the environment.147 In
analyzing the legal framework for the order, the court included Agenda 21
and the Brundtland Report as important texts for its decision and held that
sustainable development, as defined as a balance between ecology and
development, is international customary law.148
Five additional judicial opinions relevant to the implementation of
Agenda 21 are directly mentioned in the report.149 The opinions identify a
fundamental right to a healthy environment that must be considered in the
conflict between industry growth and environmental health.150
143

Id. at 41–43.
Id. at 41.
145
GOV’T OF INDIA, supra note 132, at 35.
146
This case is not directly cited in the report but is instructional in its direct inclusion of Agenda 21.
See generally Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India, 5 S.C.C. 647 (Aug. 28, 1996); see also
BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 11, at 43 (defining “precautionary principle”).
147
See generally Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum, 5 S.C.C. 647 (Aug. 28, 1996); Grantham Res.
Institute on Climate Change & the Environment, What is the polluter pays principle?, Feb. 17, 2014,
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/faqs/what-is-the-polluter-pays-principle/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2017)
(defining “polluter pays principle”).
148
Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India, 5 S.C.C. 647 (Aug. 28, 1996). There is
disagreement as to whether sustainable development is customary law; however, its widespread identification
as a goal might support its role as a fairly general principle of customary law. See, e.g., Virginie Barral,
Sustainable Development in International Law: Nature and Operation of an Evolutive Legal Norm, 23
EUROPEAN J. INT'L L. 377, 385–88 (2012).
149
CSD, supra note 131.
150
The five opinions summarized in the report are as follows: Mathew Lukose vs. Kerala State
Pollution Control Board, 2 Kerala L.J. 717 (1990) (providing for a fundamental right to a healthy environment
and identifying the conflict between industry growth and the risk of infringement upon this right); M.C.
Mehta vs. Union of India, 2 Scale S.P. 89 (1996) (requiring industry to cooperate with the construction of
common Effluent Treatment Plants (CETPs) in 28 industrial areas in Delhi); Subhash Kumar vs. State of
144
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The United States’ Ten-Year Report151

Rather than focusing on the incorporation of environmental issues into
decision-making, as India does, the United States report focuses on decision
making that balances environmental, social, and economic considerations. It
further identifies as important those actions that facilitate communication
across federal agencies, levels of government, and between public and private
entities.
The United States identifies the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”) of 1969 as the “single coherent statement of national policy on the
integration of environment and development in decision-making at the federal
level,” and suggests it is “perhaps the world’s first statement on sustainable
development.”152 The report goes on to discuss the implementation of NEPA
and identifies the important role of the Environmental Impact Analysis as “a
decision-making process designed to integrate environmental, economic and
social concerns.”153 The report identifies the Presidential Council on
Environmental Quality (“CEQ”), which oversees implementation and assists
in dispute resolution under NEPA, and the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) as the primary federal bodies involved in reviewing the impact of

Bihar, 1 S.C.C 598 (1991), (identifying the right to a healthy environment and the control of pollution as
enumerated in the Constitution Art. 21 and Art. 32); M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India, 3 Scale S.P. 58 (1996)
(identifying a process for determining a process for relocation of industries near the Taj Mahal); Indian
Council for Enviro-Legal Action vs. Union of India, 2 Scale 44, 73 (1996) (developing the framework for a
procedure to be used in setting up chemical industries).
151
Certain groups in the United States see Agenda 21 as an internationalist plot to take over governance
of the country, halt population growth, and force the adoption of sustainable modes of action. Agenda 21
thus is term akin to conspiracy, abuse of power, and shadow governance, particularly via the right-wing “Tea
Party.” Commentator Glenn Beck published the thriller Agenda 21 and politicians, such as Michele
Bachmann, saw the imprint of this conspiracy in the move towards energy efficient light bulbs in
governmental buildings. Stephanie Mencimer, “We Don’t Need None of That Smart Growth Communism,”
MOTHER JONES (Mar./Apr. 2011), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2010/11/tea-party-agenda-21-unsustainable-development/. See also AM. POL’Y, Agenda 21, https://americanpolicy.org/agenda21/ (last
visited June 23, 2017).
152
U.N., U.S. Country Profile, Johannesburg Summit 2002, at 31 (2002), http://www.un.org/esa/
agenda21/natlinfo/wssd/usa.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Country Profile].
153
Id. NEPA requires agencies considering “[f]ederal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment” to conduct an environmental impact analysis prior to deciding how and if to move
forward with the project. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2012).
NEPA’s goal is to ensure that environmental impacts are considered prior to a decision is made with respect
to a project. See, e.g. Metcalf v. Daly, 214 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2000) (indicating an elevated scrutiny of the
NEPA analysis by NOAA in its approval of a whale hunt because the environmental concerns were evaluated
after the decision was essentially already made).
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actions on the human environment.154 According to the report, the thirty years
of NEPA implementation (from inception to approximately 2000) saw
strengthening of the environmental decision-making process through agency
activities and judicial analysis.155
The diversity of agencies and legislation involved in federal oversight
of natural resources and pollution control in the United States results in some
level of fragmentation of decision-making and hampers integration of
sustainable development considerations.156 According to the report, the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 provides one mechanism
for integrating decision-making across agencies. Although it does not
explicitly create a sustainability analysis framework, its procedures facilitate
agency collaboration on issues of development and the environment.157 An
additional set of integrative actions identified in the report are voluntary
initiatives. These initiatives, such as the Partners for the Environment
program, facilitate partnerships between agencies such as the EPA and private
actors to improve environmental decision-making in the private sector.158
While these actions were already in place to some extent before the
conference, the United States did work to more specifically implement
Agenda 21 at the national level. Immediately after the Rio Conference, the
United States established the President’s Council on Sustainable
Development to help implement Agenda 21 by advising the president on
“strategies to achieve prosperity, opportunity, and a healthy environment.”159
This Council was the “only presidential or federal advisory panel charged with
recommending policies across the full spectrum of economic, environmental,
and social policy issues.”160 Beyond this, the report identifies the EPA154

U.S. Country Profile, supra note 152. CEQ produces the regulations guiding the implementation of
NEPA. The Whitehouse, Council on Environmental Quality, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq (last visited
Oct. 23, 2017).
155
U.S. Country Profile, supra note 152. The report further emphasizes the success of NEPA as
evidenced by state adoption of similar statutes.
156
Id. at 31 (listing Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy and Commerce and notes that the
EPA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Department of Justice among others
as overseeing national resource and pollution issues).
157
Id. at 31–32; see also Office of Management and Budget, Government Performance Results Act of
1993, Obama White House Archives, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/mgmt-gpra/gplaw2m (last
visited Oct. 4, 2017). The implementation of the act is overseen by the Office of Management and Budget.
158
U.S. Country Profile, supra note 152.
159
Id. See also CSD, Institutional Aspects of Sustainable Development in the U.S. (Apr. 1, 1997),
http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/countr/usa/inst.htm; see also President’s Council on Sustainable
Development Overview, Clinton Whitehouse Archives, https://clintonwhitehouse2.archives.gov/PCSD/
Overview/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2017).
160
U.S. Country Profile, supra note 152.
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administered Common Sense Initiative as an example of partnerships for
sustainability at the federal level.161 Further integration of economic and
environmental considerations is, according to the report, apparent in
movements to include environmental impacts in the analysis of global trade
deals. For example, Executive Order 13141 requires that major trade
negotiations include analysis of potential major environmental impacts.162
These considerations, similar to the considerations of projects under NEPA,
must be undertaken early enough in negotiations to inform the negotiators.163
In addition to the general legislative and executive actions, the report
identifies agency action as well as agency cost-benefit analysis. It identifies
the environmental goals created by the EPA for clean air, ecological
protection, safe drinking water, and improved understanding of the
environment.164 Finally, the report presents the risk-benefit analysis required
by some environmental statutes, such as the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act, as an example of federal integration of economic and
environmental considerations required by legislation.165
In contrast to India, where Agenda 21 and sustainability are influential
in judicial decisions, the United States does not identify any legal proceeding
in its report, nor is Agenda 21 framed in judicial opinions as influential on the
U.S.’s decisions relating to development and the environment.166
161

Id. See also EPA, The Common Sense Initiative: A New Generation of Environmental Protection
(Apr. 1996).
162
U.S. Country Profile, supra note 152. Three types of agreements must incorporate this
environmental analysis: “comprehensive multilateral trade rounds; multilateral and bilateral trade
agreements; and major new trade liberalization agreements in the national resource sectors.” See also
Environmental Review of Trade Agreements, Exec. Order No. 13141, 64 Fed. Reg. 63, 169 (Nov. 18, 1999),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=56947.
163
U.S. Country Profile, supra note 152. The order was overseen and implemented by the United
States Trade Representative and the Chair of the CEQ (the council in charge of overseeing NEPA
implementation). Guidelines for incorporation of the order into negotiations were finalized in 2000.
Guidelines for Implementation of Executive Order 13141: Environmental Review of Trade Agreements, 64
Fed. Reg. 79, 442 (Dec. 19, 2000).
164
U.S. Country Profile, supra note 152.
165
Id. Some commentators have identified the problems with risk benefit analysis, particularly given
the risk of agency capture. These problems might indicate that the incorporation of the economics from the
point of industry might run counter to the mandate of the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21. For example,
Danica Li notes that farmworkers, who health is at risk from Azinphos-methyl because the cost to industry
outweighed in the EPA’s consideration the toxic impacts to those most exposed to the insecticide. Danica
Li, Toxic Spring: The Capriciousness of Cost-Benefit Analysis Under FIFRA’s Pesticide Registration
Process and Its Effect on Farmworkers, 103 CAL. L. REV. 1405, 1428–32 (2015).
166
The one case located that explicitly mentions Agenda 21 is Barnes v. Obama, No. 16-2299-JARGEB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91184 *2 (D. Kan. June 13, 2016) (dismissing for failure to state a claim a suit
where the plaintiff accuses the state of Kansas and the federal government of pursuing a “‘Reptilian Agenda’
he calls ‘Agenda 21’”). Agenda 21 is not a treaty and was therefore not enacted into legislation. However,
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Zambia’s Ten-Year Report

Zambia’s report resembles India’s more than it does that of the United
States because it focuses on bringing environmental issues into discussions of
development, rather than balancing environmental, social, and economic
considerations. The report identifies high-level bodies tasked with identifying
policy approaches and formulating advice to facilitate integration of
environmental and other considerations. A central body is the Ministry of
Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources, created in 2002 “to provide an
environmental policy framework, monitor, evaluate and co-ordinate its
implementation, to ensure protection of the environment and sustainable
development, management and utilization of natural resources for the benefit
of the present and future generations.”167 The Ministry acts to coordinate
national environmental programs and activities, as well as the statutory bodies
dealing with environmental issues.168 The Environmental Council of Zambia
(“ECZ”), created by an Act of Parliament in 1994, serves as an advisor to the
government regarding the environment.169
Zambia’s 194 National Environmental Action Plan is key to the
mandate of Agenda 21. This plan provides guidance for addressing
environmental degradation in the country through the integration of
environmental concerns in decision-making.170 The government-sector
ministries had generally been in charge of addressing environmental issues,
but at the time of the report, the government was evaluating environmental
legislation to determine whether statutes facilitated sustainable development
international legal principles and practice can be influential in judicial decisions. See, e.g. Adam Liptak,
Justice Breyer Sees Value in a Global View of Law, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/.09/13/us/politics/justice-breyer-sees-value-in-a-global-view-of-law.html.
167
U.N., Zambia Country Profile, Johannesburg Summit 2002, at 24 (2002), http://www.un.org/esa/
agenda21/natlinfo/wssd/551ambia.pdf [hereinafter Zambia Country Profile]. The Ministry of Tourism,
Environment and Natural Resources was created through the merger of the Ministries of Tourism and
Environment and Natural Resources. See also Nat’l CHM for the Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Tourism,
Env’t and Nat. Res., Convention on Biological Diversity, http://www.biodiv.be/551ambia/implementation/
competent-institutions-and-national-authorities/mtenr (last visited Dec. 18, 2017).
168
Zambia Country Profile, supra note 167.
169
Id. The Act creating the Council was the Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act
(EPPCA) and the focus of its legislative activities involves controlling pollution to protect human health and
welfare. Nat’l CHM for the Republic of Zambia, Envtl. Council of Zambia, Convention on Biological
Diversity, http://zm.chm-cbd.net/implementation/competent-institutions-and-national-authorities/statutorybodies-under-mtenr/ecz (last visited Dec. 12, 2017).
170
Zambia Country Profile, supra note 167 at 25. The principles guiding the NEAP are akin to those
expressed in Agenda 21, “[t]he right of citizens to a clean and healthy environment. Local community and
private sector participation in natural resources management. Obligatory Environmental Impact Assessments
of major development projects in all sectors.” Nat’l CHM for the Republic of Zambia, supra note 169.
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considerations.171 The report identifies several acts of legislation, such as the
Pollution Control Act of 1990 and the Forests Act of 1999, addressing issues
relevant to the environment.172
Zambia’s report identifies several sectoral development programs as
important in its decision-making framework.173 Sectoral development
programs aim to support reducing poverty through an increase in economic
growth at the local level. They tend to involve a variety of public and private
entities focused on expanding development. An example of such a sectoral
development program is the Environmental Support Program that, with the
World Bank’s support, is tasked with bringing environmental concerns to the
government’s Strategy of Poverty Reduction.
Ultimately, according to the report, “[t]he challenge . . . remains to
translate the policy provisions [of the National Environmental Action Plan
and various other Legislative Acts] into reality.”174 This translation is
identified as dependent on getting local communities involved and garnering
sufficient funding for activities from groups such as the United States Agency
for International Development, the United Nations Development Program, the
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, the Finnish
International Development Agency, and the Netherlands Government.175
Similar to the United States, and unlike India, Zambia does not include
the judiciary in its report on the integration of sustainable development in
various national structures involved in decision-making.
4.

Summary of Reports and Analysis of Reporting

The reports differ among the parties in part because the concept of
sustainable development in Agenda 21 is multifaceted. In particular, Zambia
and India, the two developing countries, primarily reported on legal and
political avenues for incorporating environmental considerations into
decisions about development. Both included an extensive list of political
bodies, legislative acts, and agency regulations, and, in the case of India,
judicial opinions. In contrast, the United States reported on political and legal
171
172
173
174
175

Zambia Country Profile, supra note 167 at 24.
Id.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 73.
Id.
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avenues that facilitate weighing the environment versus economics in making
decisions. Its report includes fewer examples of political and legal actions
and does not incorporate laws and regulations that mandate consideration of
the environment (for example, the Endangered Species Act). While neither
India nor the United States report on actions conditioned on external funding,
a large section of Zambia’s report lists several sectoral development programs
that need aid from non-governmental organizations (“NGO’s”) and other
countries.
In addition to individual country reports, the CSD made public three
reports arising from a study of the reporting experience itself.176 Since
Chapters 8 and 38 of Agenda 21 focus on the reporting aspect, this analysis is
useful to evaluate the effectiveness of these sections of Agenda 21. By 2002,
124 countries reported to the CSD, and their profiles were posted to the
Sustainable Development Website.177 This resulted in increased cooperation
between governments, NGOs, and private companies’ stakeholders,
especially in developing countries.178 Reporting also helped countries prepare
for the annual CSD sessions.179
By the time of the analysis, interest and momentum on the part of at
least some governments in providing information to the CSD was declining.180
Comments from twenty-four countries indicated that the process of producing
the national reports was valuable in supporting government assessment and
stimulation of sustainable development progress.181 Problems with reporting
included the lack of sufficient understanding of the concept of sustainable
development.182
In sum, a number of parties initially followed the Chapters 8 and 38
reporting and transparency components of Agenda 21. Participants found that
this reporting was a useful tool in their engagement with the subsequent
176

CSD, Background Paper for the Meeting of National Focal Points on Improving Future National
Reporting to the Commission on Sustainable Development at 2 (Feb. 12–13, 2002) (referring to the mandate
in Agenda 21 Chapter 38.13 for the CSD to keep track of national implementation of Agenda 21 and evaluate
progress based upon national reports).
177
Id. The Sustainable Development Website is at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org (last visited
Dec. 2, 2017). It includes recent country reports and analysis but does not currently host the reports used in
this analysis.
178
CSD, supra note 176, at 2.
179
Id. at 7.
180
See generally id. at 4.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 5.
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conference. This reporting is a form of “peer-pressure,” where involvement
in the community of nations drives actions.
According to the report, there were issues with the capacity of countries
to report successfully and the consistency of the identification of “sustainable
development” by participants. The apparent decline in the engagement of
some governments by 2002 also indicates that, while there was some
compliance initially, this enthusiasm for reporting risked waning after ten
years of implementation.
D.

Evaluation of Agenda 21

The effectiveness of international legal agreements can be analyzed
from multiple lenses. The more parties that comply with obligatory language,
the more “legally effective” the agreement is. Furthermore, the more parties
that, as a result of the agreement, shift behavior towards achieving the
agreement’s goal, the more “behaviorally effective” the agreement is.183
Finally, the more the actions under the agreement result in solutions to the
original problems, the more the agreement exhibits “problem-solving
effectiveness.”184
1.

The Legal Effectiveness of Agenda 21

Agenda 21 is not a treaty under the Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties and does not include legally binding language, for example the term
“shall.”185 However, it does include hortatory language such as “should.”186
Thus, “legal compliance” with Chapter 8, and the subsequent 1997 call to
produce NSDSs by 2002, is indicated by the extent to which individual nations
completed a coherent national review, identified structures and policies to
ensure that decision-making at all levels involved consideration of sustainable
development, and created a NSDS.
A majority, 122 of 188 parties or 65%, submitted publicly available
reports by 2002. This indicates that parties generally complied with Chapter
8 by evaluating national decision-making structures for integration of the
183
See, BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 11, at 253 (identifying various approaches to analyzing
effectiveness of agreements); see also Raustiala, supra note 101, at 393–94.
184
BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 11 at 253.
185
See generally Agenda 21, supra 24.
186
Id.
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environment and economy in decision-making. It also indicates broad
compliance with the suggestion of Chapter 38 to report on this activity.187
Thus, by the measure of sheer proportionality, at the ten-year mark, Chapters
8 and 38 showed some level of legal effectiveness. Fewer than half of the
parties to the plan submitted a NSDS in time for the 2002 World Summit on
Sustainable Development—85 of 188 parties, or 45%. Thus, the Chapter 8.7
expectation that all parties create an NDS was less legally effective.
2.

The Behavioral Effectiveness of Agenda 21

Identifying the behavioral effectiveness of Chapters 8 and 38 of Agenda
21 involves determining whether the implementation of policies, legal
structures, and a NSDS shifted the process of national and subnational
decision-making towards ensuring inclusion of sustainable development
considerations. While there is no counterfactual world without Agenda 21, it
is possible to identify patterns consistent with shifting behavior. The more a
country considers sustainable development in its policy goals, the higher the
chance it is shifting decision-making behavior.
Agenda 21’s goal of shifting governmental behavior to include the
environment in decision-making is similar to the goal of NEPA in the United
States, the procedural statute influential in the creation of Agenda 21.188 It is
thus useful to evaluate the operation of NEPA as a way to illuminate the
behavioral effectiveness of Agenda 21. NEPA requires that an environmental
impact analysis be conducted and environmental impact statements be
produced by federal agencies prior to committing to a particular project or
plan.189 It is seen as widely successful at forcing agencies to consider (or at
least identify) the environmental impact of their plan.190 However, early on
the Supreme Court held that NEPA did not create substantive obligations,
only procedural obligations.191 Some commentators suggest, therefore,
NEPA does not compel final decisions to adopt the plan that best balances

187

Earth Summit 2002, National Strategies for Sustainable Development and National Reports,
http://earthsummit2002.org/es/national-resources/nssd.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2017) (hosting National
Strategies for Sustainable Development reports).
188
LYNTON KEITH CALDWELL, THE NATIONAL ENVTL. POL’Y ACT: AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 108
(1998).
189
442 U.S.C. § 4332(1)(c)(v).
190
See, e.g., Environmental Law Institute, NEPA Success Stories: Celebrating 40 Years of
Transparency and Open Government, (Aug. 2010) (describing NEPA’s implementation over four decades).
191
See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350–51 (1989).
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environmental, social, and economic considerations.192 Despite its apparent
lack of substantive obligations, environmental law commentators see NEPA
as an important cornerstone of United States environmental policy.193 Even
though NEPA is generally viewed as not imposing substantive requirements,
commentators believe it still evidences effectiveness at the behavioral level
because it at least forces the issues in front of decision-makers and the
public—a necessary first step in norm shifting.194
The Chapter 8 review and integration, by necessity, forces each national
government to incorporate sustainable development perspectives at least at
the point of review and evaluation, similar to the requirements of NEPA.
Chapter 38’s suggested reporting inserts some potential transparency into the
procedure. It therefore, in a way, pressures individual parties to present their
evaluations of their own implementation in a manner that accords with the
general sustainable development goals of Agenda 21.
Judicially-imposed requirements for agencies to meet the procedures of
NEPA ensure that agencies take their NEPA duties seriously or find
themselves in court. For Agenda 21, the reviews were in response to a
political commitment rather than a legal obligation, and therefore their
completion certainly suggests some self-imposed shift in behavior. However,
the content of the reports differs drastically, as indicated above in the
discussion of the United States, India, and Zambia. It appears first that the
parties differed in their interpretation of what structural implementation of
sustainable development into decision-making looks like. This is not
surprising, given the amorphousness of the agreement.195 Some, including
India and Zambia, interpreted it as a requirement to insert environmental
192

Walter A. Rosenbaum, Capacity for Governance: Innovation and the Challenge of the Third Era, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. ENVTL. POL’Y 145–47 (Sheldon Kamieniecki, Michael Kraft eds., 2013)
(summarizing the tension between the procedural success and the possible lack of substantive obligations
under NEPA); see also William H. Rodgers, NEPA at Twenty: Mimicry and Recruitment in Environmental
Law, 20 ENVTL. L. 485, 500–02 (1990) (describing the loss of substantive obligations under NEPA); Donald
N. Zillman and Peggy Gentles, NEPA’s Evolution: the Decline of Substantive Review, 20 ENVTL. L. 505, 530
(1990) (suggesting that the judiciary pulled the substantive teeth of this statute). But see Marion D. Miller,
The National Environmental Policy Act and Judicial Review after Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council and Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 223, 251 (1991) (suggesting
that the Supreme Court’s anti-substantive readings of NEPA can be interpreted as highly case specific).
193
Rodgers, supra note 192, at 500–02; see also Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy
Act in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Reappraisal and a Peek Behind the Curtains, 100 GEO. L.J. 1507, 1519
(2009) (arguing that, even in attempting to limit NEPA’s substantive obligation the Supreme Court created a
higher profile for NEPA in decision making and in this way promoted the interests of environmentalists).
194
See e.g. Lazarus, supra note 193, at 1519.
195
Ellie Carroll, Twenty-Five Years in the Making: Why Sustainable Development Has Eluded the UN,
and How Community-Driven Development Offers the Solution, 32 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 545, 552 (2010).
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considerations into decision-making. Others, such as the United States,
viewed it as requiring the balancing of environmental costs against economic
benefits.
Further clouding the issue of whether Agenda 21 affected behavior, the
reports highlight work towards sustainability regardless of whether the
legislation is promulgated directly in response to Agenda 21. Similarly, these
reports do not indicate whether a State is actually shifting behavior beyond
simply taking the time to prepare the report for the CDS.196 The reporting
indicates that one benefit to reporting countries was continued engagement
with Agenda 21. This is similar to the impact of NEPA on parties forced to
integrate environmental impacts into analyses prior to decision-making.
However, the extensive but broad directives of Agenda 21, with respect to
what exactly countries were to consider, makes it possible for the reports to
include a number of actions likely not involving any real shift in decisionmaking processes towards sustainability.197 Thus, these ten-year reports do
indicate some low level of behavioral effectiveness, but are not sufficiently
focused to indicate clear shifts in behavior to come into line with the goals of
Agenda 21.
More recent behavioral effectiveness can be evaluated based upon the
adoption of NSDSs. A number of countries have participated in producing
and submitting NSDSs. However, the content of these NSDSs indicates a
lower behavioral effectiveness than the numbers alone indicate. While 85
nations (and none of the parties reviewed here) had adopted NSDSs by 2002,
by 2010, 106 nations had adopted NSDSs (including India and Zambia, but
not the United States) and 10 more nations were in the process of adopting
NSDSs.198 Thus, by 2010, 116 of 172 or 67%, of countries were
implementing, or in the process of implementing, NSDSs.199 This included
most European and Asian countries and much of Oceania. Similarly, about
196
For example, while the United States cites the PCSD as an important body for furthering executive
action in the arena of sustainable development, most of its extensive recommendations, eminently suitable
as a basis for a NSDS, were never implemented. Dernbach, supra note 125, at 723 (noting that in 2002 “[t]he
United States ha[d] no coherent overall strategy for sustainable development . . . .”).
197
For example, the United States reports on the incorporation of cost estimates into the Fungicide,
Insecticide, Rodenticide Act as a part of its approach to following Agenda 21. See U.S. Country Profile,
supra note 152. However, rather than increasing sustainable behavior, incorporating cost in this statute tends
to undercut environmental protections. See Li, supra note 165, at 1428–32.
198
Stakeholder Forum for Sustainable Development, Detailed Review of implementation of Agenda
21 48–49 (Jan. 2012) [hereinafter Stakeholder Forum].
199
Id.; see also Cicero Lucena & John Gummer, Why Rio failed in the past and how it can succeed this
time, GUARDIAN (June 12, 2012) https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/jun/12/rio20-agendapoliticians-john-gummer (last visited Nov. 11, 2017) (noting that 172 parties signed on to the plan).
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one-third to one-half of South and Central American and African countries
were either implementing their NSDSs, developing an NSDS, or
implementing some sustainability components nationwide. 200 The other
countries had not reported on the progress of their NSDSs.201 Most of the
Middle East was unreported, and North America ranged from implementing
(Mexico), in progress (Canada), to no NSDS (United States).202
Even in those countries implementing NSDSs, the process is in its
infancy.203 Thus, while the submission and implementation of NSDSs
indicates a more specific mode of compliance with the expectations of Agenda
21 than the reports themselves, they do not demonstrate a full shift to a
sustainable development approach. There is some indication of behavioral
effectiveness as some parties have shifted their behavior to actually create
NSDSs. However, the form of these NSDSs is less thorough than anticipated
by Agenda 21, and thus any behavioral effectiveness is moderate.
3.

The Problem-Solving Effectiveness of Agenda 21

The problem-solving effectiveness of Agenda 21 can be evaluated
based on both narrow and broad goals. Narrowly, Chapters 8 and 38 of
Agenda 21 aimed to compel parties to incorporate sustainable development
into decision-making structures and to report on this incorporation, as well as
on the NSDS, to the CSD. More broadly, Agenda 21 sought to solve the
problem of negative environmental impacts from development and the
increasing rate of global poverty.204 While Agenda 21 experienced some
problem-solving effectiveness in its narrower goals by affecting decisionmaking structures, it was not effective at solving the large-scale problems of
development, the environment, and global poverty.
As indicated above, 67% of parties submitted reports to the ten-year
conference. This indicates that Agenda 21 was somewhat effective at forcing
parties to review their own activities and implement national strategies and
200

Stakeholder Forum, supra note 198, at 48–49, Fig.1; see, e.g., P. Chitundu-Musonda, The National
Strategy for Sustainable Development Process in Zambia, UNECA (Nov. 2007), http://www1.uneca.org/
Portals/rio20/documents/Workshop-Institutional-StrategicFrameworks/CountryReports/NSSD%20Zambia
%20Nov%202007.pdf (reporting on Zambia’s progress in implementing an NSDS).
201
Stakeholder Forum, supra note 198, at 48–49, Fig.1.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id. at 1. The ultimate goals included “improve[ment of] the living standard of those in need; better
manag[ment] and protect[ion of] the ecosystem; and . . . a more prosperous future for all.”
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other policies to ensure that decision-making includes sustainable
development considerations. However, even twenty years later, not all parties
have reported whether they intend to create NSDSs, and countries such as the
United States indicate that they do not plan to submit one. Furthermore,
according to the United Nations’ own 2012 report, “in practice . . . most
nations are still only at the early stages of implementing strategies” that “offer
an integrated and participatory system to develop visions, goals and targets
for sustainable development, and to coordinate implementation and
review.”205 Thus, while behavioral compliance with the evaluation and
reporting components of Chapters 8 and 38 were relatively effective, the
ultimate goal of changing behavior and creating a norm of integrating
sustainable development into the decision-making level appears far less
effective.
Agenda 21 appears to have failed to achieve some of its broader goals,
such as those to eliminate global poverty and environmental degradation
caused by development.206 Since the implementation of Agenda 21, the
number of people experiencing poverty has increased, and instability and
climate shifts have decreased the average standard of living.207 While the lack
of a counterfactual world, one without Agenda 21, makes it difficult to assess
the plan’s impact on poverty, it is interesting that, following the 2000
inception of the Millennium Development Goals, the percentage of the
world’s population experiencing extreme poverty dropped measurably.208
Furthermore, rates of consumption continue to be unsustainable and natural
resource depletion continues apace.209 Specific measures evaluated in the
United Nations twenty-year report, such as the rate of increase in the number
205

Id. at 48.
U.N. DIV. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., BACK TO OUR COMMON FUTURE: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
IN THE 21ST CENTURY PROJECT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (2012), stating that “[t]he political deal that
emerged from the Earth Summit in 1992 has, for various reasons, never been fulfilled. Neither the expected
outcomes—elimination of poverty, reduction in disparities in standard of living, patterns of consumption and
production that are compatible with the carrying capacity of ecosystems, sustainable management of
renewable resources—nor the agreed means to achieve them, have materialized.”) [hereinafter BACK TO OUR
COMMON FUTURE].
207
Stakeholder Forum for Sustainable Development, Review of Implementation of Agenda 21 and the
Rio Principles 7 (Jan. 2012) [hereinafter Stakeholder Forum of Agenda 21 and the Rio Principles]; see also
UNHCR, Climate Change and Disasters, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/climate-change-and-disasters.html
(last visited Nov. 6, 2017) (noting that harmful impacts from climate change continue currently).
208
See, e.g., The world has made great progress in eradicating extreme poverty, ECONOMIST, March
30, 2017, https://www.economist.com/news/international/21719790-going-will-be-much-harder-now-world
-has-made-great-progress.
209
Stakeholder Forum of Agenda 21 and the Rio Principles, supra note 207, at 7; BACK TO OUR
COMMON FUTURE, supra note 206, at 3–4, Fig 3 (showing steady increases in global material use and energy
consumption over 100—150 years including the two decades since Agenda 21 and the Rio Conference).
206
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of undernourished people and CO2 emissions and the resilience of fish stocks,
were determined to be “moving in the wrong direction.”210
However, the framework of Agenda 21 might not be the culprit.211
Rather, the assumptions underlying the framework—the idea that technology
would help address the tensions between development and the environment—
appear to have been misplaced.212 The goals, in their ambition, might have
doomed Agenda 21. It is possible that they “constituted a challenge that
[c]ould not be met.”213 Further, the very “idea that both the environment and
development can be accommodated within a single paradigm may be
[fundamentally] contradictory.”214 Finally, “sustainable development” itself
may be the problem because it is “not about giving priority to environmental
concerns, but rather, it is about incorporating environmental assets into the
economic system to ensure the sustainability of the economic system.”215
Rather than recognizing that environmental and social issues cannot be
constrained to predictable, efficiency-driven frameworks, sustainable
development, and Agenda 21 rest on the assumption that issues across the
board can be fit to allow for the most efficient economic growth, thus
benefitting all.216
Agenda 21 did not eliminate global poverty, nor did it result in a cleaner
environment.217 In 2012, twenty years after its inception, the United Nations
Assembly officially moved away from the global framework developed in
Agenda 21.218 Nonetheless, the international community continues to work
towards sustainable development, and in September 2015, world leaders
committed themselves to an ambitious global agenda—“Transforming our
210

BACK TO OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 206, at 1, 2, Fig. 1, 2.
Id. at ii (noting “[o]pinions may differ on whether our current framework for action was never fully
put to the test due to lack of political will or whether it was insufficient to succeed. The fact is that we have
not succeeded.”).
212
Id. at 4.
213
Geoffrey Palmer, What Went Wrong at Rio?, 70 WASH. U. L. R. 1005, 1013 (1992).
214
Geoffrey Palmer, Setting the Scene for the “New Thinking on Sustainability” Conference, 13 N.Z.
J. OF PUBLIC & INT’L. L. 17, 19 (2014).
215
Timothy Doyle, Sustainable Development and Agenda 21: The Secular Bible of Global Free
Markets and Puralist Democracy, 19 THIRD WORLD Q. 771, 774 (1998) (quoting S. BEDER, SUSTAINABLE
DEV. 8 (1994)).
216
Id. at 775.
217
Stakeholder Forum of Agenda 21 and the Rio Principles, supra note 207, at 7; BACK TO OUR
COMMON FUTURE, supra note 206, at 3–4, Fig 3.
218
General Assembly Res. 67/203 2012 Implementation of Agenda 21, Programme for the Further
Implementation of Agenda 21 and the Outcomes of the World Summit on Sustainable Development and of
the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.un.org/en/ga/
search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/203.
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world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”219 Furthermore, the
Rio+20 Conference resulted in the initiative that produced the United Nations
Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, an information hub, and
gathering of all commitments to furthering sustainable development goals.220
This platform has served to collect a variety of commitments to sustainable
development that respond to various international agreements (such as
Agenda 21) and other initiatives.221 The world community continues to at
least talk about sustainable development, and in this way, Agenda 21 made a
mark.
IV.

THE CLIMATE CHANGE PROCESS LEADING
AND ITS STRUCTURE

TO THE

PARIS AGREEMENT

The Paris Agreement is the most recent international climate change
treaty. It follows on the Kyoto Protocol and is similarly encompassed within
the framework of the UNFCCC. Below, the international climate change
regime and development of the Paris Agreement are introduced. This is
followed by a summary of the legal structure of the Paris Agreement with a
focus on the Article 4’s NDC reporting requirement and Article 13’s
transparency mechanism. Finally, article explores implications of the current
NDCs on the ultimate goal of the Paris Agreement.
A.

The Context of International Climate Change Discussions

The UNFCCC was produced at the same time as Agenda 21. As of
today, 197 countries are party to the Convention, including the United States
and China.222 Unlike Agenda 21, however, it is a treaty that is focused solely
on climate change. It creates the structure for governance over the
international climate regime, providing the authority for the adoption of both
the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.223 It is a general framework
219
Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, U. N.,
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
220
Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, U.N., https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/ (last
visited Nov. 5, 2017). This initiative was the result of State and NGO pressure in the preparations for the
Rio+20 Conference. Edith Brown Weiss, Voluntary Commitments as Emerging Instruments in International
Environmental Law, 44 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 83, 87 (2014).
221
Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, supra note 220.
222
See Climate Change, U.N., http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/items/2352.php (last
visited Dec. 10, 2017) (listing parties to the UNFCCC).
223
See BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 11, at 119. Since they both were adopted under the UNFCCC,
they are the type of “associated legal instrument” that incorporate aspects of the UNFCCC. Id. at 212. The
Paris Agreement also explicitly mentions furthering the goals of the UNFCCC as a purpose in Article 2 thus
firmly ensconcing the Paris Agreement as a component of the global climate agreement framework. Id.
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further fleshed out by the results of conferences of the parties (“COPs”) where
more specific agreements are generated.224
The first treaty enacted under the UNFCCC was the Kyoto Protocol,
which was adopted in 1997. The Protocol is top-down, with legally binding
emissions caps for each developed country and a compliance system.225
Developing countries, including China and India, are not bound by these
objectives. As a result of the treaty’s ultimate failure to reach the United
States and Canada, who are not parties to the treaty, as well as China, and
India, who, as developing countries, are not under obligation to limit
emissions under the treaty, it impacts only 24% of current global emissions.
As such, it is insufficient to address climate change.226 The bottom-up
structure of the Paris Agreement is a response, to some extent, to the Kyoto
Protocol’s lack of problem solving efficiency.
The structure of the Paris Agreement was developed by the parties to
the UNFCCC over time. Prior to the Conference of the Parties in Paris at the
end of 2015, an ad hoc working group met numerous times. The group
decided that the Agreement would have a hybrid structure, with both topdown, but nonbinding, and bottom-up, but binding, components. In
particular, the group sketched out the NDCs’ procedural requirement and
called for countries to submit their Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions (“INDCs”)227 prior to the Paris Conference.228 The negotiators
focused on producing an agreement that was transparent, rendered the parties
accountable, and included a mechanism for parties to update their efforts to
mitigate climate change over the life of the agreement.229
On December 15, 2015, the twenty-first Conference of the Parties
resulted in the Paris Agreement. It was hailed by United Nations Secretary
General Ban Ki-moon as a “monumental triumph.”230 The victory was a
224

Id. at 142; see also Paris Agreement art. 1.
BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 11, at 105.
226
Id. at 108.
227
Parties submit intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) prior to ratification or
acceptance of the Agreement, for example, prior to the Paris COP. When the party formally ratifies or accepts
the agreement, it also submits its NDC which is then recorded in the registry. See Paris Climate Agreement
Q&A, POL’Y HUB INT’L, https://www.c2es.org/content/paris-climate-agreement-qa/ (last visited Dec. 14,
2017).
228
See BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 11, at 115.
229
Id. at 215.
230
U.N. Chief Hails New Climate Change Agreement as “monumental triumph,” U.N.,
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2015/12/un-chief-hails-new-climate-change-agreement-asmonumental-triumph/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2017).
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widely adopted multilateral environmental treaty, an agreement by nearly all
of the nations of the world to attack the “super wicked” “global commons”
problem of climate change. Via “unprecedented political will” the
negotiations resulted in a “long-term, balanced and virtually universally
accepted agreement, despite the many crisscrossing red lines of parties.”231
However, the “victory” of the Paris Agreement did not result in
guaranteed emissions caps that could solve the problem of climate change. At
the point the Agreement was adopted, the INDCs submitted to the conference
indicated that the Agreement would result in an estimated 2.6–3.1°C increase
in global mean temperature over the next century.232 This is a reduction from
the “business as usual” emissions trajectory predicted to result in a 4.0°C or
higher increase.233 It, however, does not meet the Agreement’s goal of a
maximum increase of 1.5°C.234 Further, it does not even meet the 2.0°C
maximum increase once considered by some to be a “guardrail” for preventing
massive climate destabilization through massive positive feedback.235
B.

Legal Structure of the Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement is comprised of a total of twenty-nine articles
amounting to twenty-five pages in length in its English translation. The
relatively short length belies the fact that it sufficiently satisfied the widely
divergent concerns of negotiating parties such that, as of December 2017, all
nations of the world are signatories.236 Its economy of language also hides the
complexity of its legal structure. It contains binding obligations, such as the
requirement to submit an NDC. It does not bind parties to actually achieve
231
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increase above 1.0°C risks catastrophic positive feedback loops).
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the NDCs they submit. However, it does also incorporate the expectation that
parties will, over time, submit increasingly ambitious NDCs.237 The
Agreement further contains recommendations, encouragement, aspirations
and understandings.
The result is a treaty that primarily obliges parties to report national
targets, and to share information about state action and methods of emission
reduction. However, it does not bind the parties to particular outcomes.238
Instead, it aims at compliance as a result of “peer-pressure,” rather than a topdown enforcement mechanism, similar to Agenda 21.239 The peer-pressure
arises because the core obligatory language involves the NDC mitigation
mechanism of Article 4 combined with the transparency requirements of
Article 13 and the global stocktake of Article 14.240 Other binding language
requires information sharing, aspects of general financing, technology
sharing, and aspects of adaptation.241
The Article 4 NDC mechanism is reminiscent of Agenda 21’s Chapter
8 because it allows parties to identify their own targets. Unlike Agenda 21,
however, Article 4 of the Paris Agreement includes the word “shall.” In
contrast to “should,” the strongest language of Agenda 21, “shall” obliges
parties more than the recommending “should” or expecting “will.” Article
4(2) is the article in which parties are legally required to identify NDCs. It
states that “[e]ach party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive
nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve.” This section
further compels the parties to attempt to mitigate the effects of climate change
in an effort to reach these NDCs, stating that “parties shall pursue domestic
mitigation measures with the aim of achieving the objectives of such
contributions.”242 This clause creates an obligation of conduct for each party
to produce and report on its NDC, and is reflective of Agenda 21’s
237
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recommendation that parties act to integrate sustainable development into
decision-making.243
Article 4(9) requires that parties “communicate a nationally determined
contribution every five years.” However, it leaves the specifics of the
reporting mechanism to be determined in future conferences. Subsequent
NDCs “will represent a progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally
determined contribution.”244 Parties are also obligated to account for the
“anthropogenic emissions and removals” that correspond to their NDCs.245
Recommended characteristics of this accounting include “transparency,
accuracy, completeness, comparability and consistency, and . . . avoidance of
double counting.”246 Art 4(12) requires NDS to be “recorded in a public
registry maintained by the secretariat.”
Article 13 outlines the transparency mechanism and includes
information arising out of Article 4. It requires parties to submit reports of
national inventories of “anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by
sinks of greenhouse gases” and “[i]nformation necessary to track progress
made in implementing and achieving its nationally determined contribution
under Article 4.”247 Finally, the information included in the transparency
mechanism will be reviewed in a “global stocktake in 2023 and every five
years thereafter.”248 The stocktake is a collective assessment by the parties of
current progress and means by which targets may be increased in ambition to
better attack the problem of climate change.249 This stocktake will help to
“inform Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner,
[their actions] in a nationally determined manner.”250
The five-year reporting cycle, the periodic stocktakes, and the general
expectation that the “efforts of all parties will represent a progression over
time” enumerated in Articles 3 and 14 are part of the ambition cycle which
aims to progressively reduce emissions over time. Because the NDCs
243
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submitted before the Paris Meeting failed to reduce emissions enough to
prevent catastrophic effects, the final agreement needed to provide a
mechanism to increase the ambition of NDCs in order to ramp down emissions
over time.251
Agenda 21 does not require a public database, but the Commission for
Sustainable Development does make reports publically available. Underlying
this policy of making reports public is the understanding that the risk of
international embarrassment theoretically results in parties feeling bound to
comply with the purpose of an instrument (sustainable development nationally
considered and reduction in emissions to reach the 1.5 °C target), despite the
lack of a clear legal obligation. Even in the absence of legally binding,
enforceable targets, the Paris Agreement provides a focus for nations to
identify parties out of compliance and penalize them through sanctions or
other means.252 The Agreement does not require that parties reach their
NDCs. However, it was negotiated under the assumption of pacta sunt
survanda—that parties would act in “good faith” as required by the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 26.253
C.

The Current State of the Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement officially entered into force on November 4,
2016, thirty days after a sufficient number of parties who account for at least
55% of global emissions submitted “instruments of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession.”254 To date, 174 of 197 signatories (88%) have ratified
the Agreement.255 In October 2017, Nicaragua announced it was ratifying the
Agreement, and on November 7, 2017, Syria ratified as well.256 Parties have
251
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continued submitting NDCs following the adoption of the Agreement. To
date, 167 signatories (85%) have submitted NDCs.257
The form of the NDCs include quantitative targets, qualitative
approaches, and both unconditional and conditional goals.258 For example,
the United States NDC target, submitted by the Obama administration, is
limited to a reduction of emissions by 26%–28% below its 2005 levels by
2025. India’s target is for a range of years, 2021–2030, and includes
qualitative targets such as sustainability and the adoption of a “climate
friendly and a cleaner path” to development.259 India also incorporates
quantitative targets, such as a reduction in gross domestic product emissions
by 2030 of 33–35% below its 2005 levels, and an increase in sequestration of
2.5 to 3 billion tons of CO2.260 Zambia’s NDC target is an emission reduction
of 47% below its 2010 levels, and is conditioned upon obtaining sufficient
funds, to support developing alternative energy resources, both internally
(approximately $15 billion) and from other nations ($35 billion).261
The brevity of the Paris Agreement is an indication of its lack of
procedural specificity and the extent to which details, such as how to ensure
the transparency of parties’ actions, are omitted.262 This simplicity facilitated
its success in drawing in parties, although it also requires parties continue to
return to the table at subsequent meetings and Conferences to hammer out the
specifics. The first Conference following the adoption of the Paris Agreement
was the 2016 “COP of Action,” in Marrakech.263 At COP 22, signatories
continued to discuss the specifics of the mechanisms, but decided to wait until
2018 to finalize details, such as the creation of a “rulebook” to allow for
evaluation, features to be included in NDCs, and other aspects of
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transparency.264 The parties at Marrakech recognized the shortcomings of the
NDCs, “call[ing] for urgently raising ambition and strengthening
cooperation amongst ourselves to close the gap between current emissions
trajectories and the pathway needed to meet the long-term temperature goals
of the Paris Agreement.”265
On November 6, 2017, COP23 opened in Bonn, Germany.266 Its goals
included “launching nations towards the next level of ambition needed to
tackle global warming and put the world on a safer and more prosperous
development path.”267 Outcomes of this conference included finalized plans
for the Talanoa Facultative Dialogue, scheduled for December 2018 in
Katowice, Poland.268 The mandate of this dialogue is an initial stocktake of
progress.269 One aspiration for this meeting is to increase the ambition of the
NDCs to bring the parties closer to the reductions necessary to effectively
mitigate climate change.270
In May 2017, six months before COP23 in Bonn, the President of the
United States, Donald Trump, announced his intention to withdraw from the
agreement.271 His early talk of pulling out of the Agreement led other parties
to suggest they will impose sanctions.272 No sanctions have been imposed yet,
although there is general condemnation of the decision.273 At the Bonn
264
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Conference in November 2017, the team sent by the Trump Administration to
push for increased use of fossil fuels was met with opposition by the rest of
the parties at the conference, which was augmented by a shadow United States
delegation of leaders from states, cities, and the private sector.274
Given that Article 28 of the Agreement does not allow parties to
withdraw until four years after it goes into force, on November 4, 2020, parties
may be waiting in part to see whether President Trump follows through on his
threat.275 However, it is clear from the proceedings at the Bonn Conference
that, while the United States federal administration is acting in bad faith,
subnational United States bodies and the rest of the world remain committed
to the Agreement, at least for now.276
V.

CONCLUSION: WHAT DOES AGENDA 21 INDICATE ABOUT THE PROBABLE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT?

The NDC reporting requirement is the heart of the Paris Agreement.
As such, its effectiveness is a focus of discussions regarding the likely success
of the Agreement in terms of climate mitigation. The experience of Agenda
21 indicates a relatively high level of legal effectiveness with this type of
bottom-up mechanism, even when sections are not binding, in part because
parties respond to peer-pressure in preparation for international conferences.
term=.c755ee85c4df (quoting North Korea and including a video of other world leaders condemning the
decision).
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Agenda 21 was less clearly successful when it came to behavioral
effectiveness and, while it saw some narrow problem-solving effectiveness, it
failed to broadly solve the problems it sought to address. Thus, while signs
of early legal effectiveness of the Paris Agreement are positive, this sort of
success is likely insufficient to drive parties to make necessary decisions. The
differences between the two will likely serve to determine whether the Paris
Agreement is ultimately successful in meeting its broad problem-solving
goals.
A.

Agenda 21 and the Paris Agreement: Legal, Behavioral, and
Problem-Solving Effectiveness

Legal effectiveness with respect to the Paris Agreement Articles 4 and
13 will depend on the likelihood that parties submit NDCs and indicate
programs aimed at mitigation to meet these NDCs. In comparison, Agenda
21 demonstrated a strong level of legal effectiveness for Chapters 8 and 38, at
least initially, with a 67% reporting rate ten years after the Rio Conference.
To date, even more parties are compliant with the Paris Agreement. Two
years after the Agreement was produced and one year after taking force, 83%
of parties have submitted publicly available NDCs. Agenda 21’s success in
the reporting arena indicates that this pattern is likely to continue, driven by
peer-pressure and the fundamental obligatory language of the Agreement.
Behavioral effectiveness of the Paris Agreement is indicated by parties
implementing policies and legal structures supporting the NDC targets that,
without this identifiable target, would see “business as usual” action. The
most obvious outcome indicating behavioral effectiveness, therefore, is for
parties to shift emission trajectories, as a result of policy changes to meet their
NDCs. In comparison, Agenda 21 was only moderately successful at shifting
behavior. While parties did report on actions towards integrating sustainable
development into decision-making processes, these actions were not in clear
response to Agenda 21. Furthermore, the specific action of creating and
implementing NSDSs appeared insufficiently thorough or robust according to
the twenty-year review.277
One year after the Paris Agreement entering into force, there are signs
that some parties might reach their NDC goals. China, for example, is “set to
277
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overachieve its ‘peak by 2030 CO2’ goal in its Nationally Determined
Contribution (NDC), as well as its own national targets.”278 India is also
potentially on track to exceed its target.279 As of today, however, no
industrialized country is on track to meet its NDC.280 As for the United States,
the Trump administration has ceased actively implementing climate change
policies and is working towards rolling back curbs on emissions.281 There is
still a chance that the United States will meet its Paris targets, however, since
sub-national states and cities, and non-state businesses have committed to
ensuring that the country meets upwards of 50% of its NDC by 2025.282
If, at the upcoming Talanoa Facilitative Dialogue, the stock-take
reveals that parties to the Paris Agreement are likely to meet their NDC
targets, the Agreement can be considered, at least in its initial phases,
behaviorally effective. While this is not a direct measurement of how
countries are behaving in comparison to how they would behave in a
counterfactual world, it is a measurement of response to the self-set target and,
in that way, is indicative of behavioral shifts. The Talanoa Conference is only
an early measure of behavioral effectiveness, however, and successful shifting
behavior will ultimately be measured by outcomes in 2020, 2025, and further
into the future.
If parties are not on track to meet their NDCs by the time of the Talanoa
Conference, it will be a much clearer indication of a failure of behavioral
effectiveness. The NDCs are self-created targets designed by each country to
be unambitious enough to be met. If the parties do not change behavior
sufficiently in response to the Paris Agreement, even to reach their own
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unambitious targets, the Agreement will not be particularly effective, at least
initially (and likely in the long run), at shifting behavior.
Problem-solving effectiveness of the Paris Agreements Articles 4 and
13 can be viewed narrowly or broadly, similar to the analysis of Agenda 21.
Narrowly, the Paris Agreement has high problem-solving effectiveness if
NDCs are reported, matched with national mitigation programs that allow
parties to meet those NDCs, and are ratcheted upward in ambition over time.
More broadly, the problem-solving effectiveness of the Paris Agreement will
be revealed by whether the action of the parties achieves the substantive
aspirations of the Agreement and its parent agreement, the UNFCCC; that is,
whether the Agreement brings the world onto a trajectory for which the global
mean temperature maximum increase is “well below 2°C” above preindustrial
temperatures.283 Agenda 21 may initially have partially met its narrow goal
of garnering participation of a majority of countries. However, it failed on its
broader goal of ensuring development was protective of the environment and
resulted in the elimination of poverty.
The initial indication of the narrow problem-solving effectiveness of
the Paris Agreement overlaps with both the legal and behavioral indicators.
The parties submitted NDCs at a high rate. However, while it appears that
countries may be on track to meet these NDCs, actual shifts in emission
trajectories will not be evident until future stocktakes, although the Talanoa
Conference will provide some indication. If parties meet their NDCs and
continue to submit NDCs over time of greater ambition, the Paris Agreement
will demonstrate effectiveness with respect to its narrow problem-solving
goal. A failure to submit NDCs in the future will be a clear indication of a
failure of this goal. Failure to meet NDCs and to increase NDC ambition will
support a conclusion that the Paris Agreement does not show narrow problemsolving effectiveness.
Whether or not the world is likely to meet the broader goal of the Paris
Agreement—to stay under the 2°C ceiling—will be measurable in the near
future. There is only a narrow window of time left during which emissions
can be reduced sufficiently to keep temperature increases below 2°C. Since
greenhouse gases accumulate in the atmosphere, insufficiently reducing
emissions or offsetting with carbon sinks will drive the world to a point at
which it will be impossible to reduce global mean temperature increase below
283
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this target. Currently, NDC submissions are of such low ambition that they
add up to a projected (and catastrophic) global mean temperature increase of
2.6–3.2°C.284 These estimated increases overshoot the 1.5°C limit targeted in
the Paris Agreement; they breeze past the estimate many scientists identify as
a mean maximum increase of 1°C.285 Unless parties increase the ambition of
their NDCs and meet this ambition with substantive action soon, the Paris
Agreement will fail broadly because the world will be locked into temperature
increases of 2°C or higher.
The international community, excluding the Trump delegation, made
clear at the Bonn Conference that it is aware the clock is ticking.286 The
Talanoa Facultative Dialogue and its stocktake will provide an important
window into the broader goal.287 If analysis at that point indicates 1.5°C or
2.0°C is possible and even perhaps probable given Party reporting, there is
hope that the Agreement will be successful broadly. If the window at that
point is considered closed to meet a 2.0°C cap, it will indicate that the
Agreement has failed in achieving the broader problem-solving goal of
staying under 2.0°C.
B.

The Differences Between the Paris Agreement and Agenda 21,
and Their Implications

The Paris Agreement differs from Agenda 21 in terms of structure,
obligations, and global context. Structurally, its clear targets, ratcheting
mechanism for increasing NDC ambition, and binding nature distinguish the
Agreement from Agenda 21. In addition, there is a higher sense of urgency
with respect to climate change than sustainable development. These
differences may provide the additional force needed to drive the parties to act
consistently with the larger goals of the Agreement.
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The Paris Agreement has a much clearer target than Agenda 21 to
reduce emissions, increase sequestration, and cap the global mean temperature
increase. Thus, the legal requirements of the parties in the Paris Agreement,
to identify actions that will reduce emissions and report on potential NDCs,
are far clearer than Agenda 21’s fairly fuzzy goal of integrating environmental
and economic concerns into decision-making. Furthermore, Agenda 21 did
not incorporate a mechanism to increase consideration of sustainability over
time. The Paris Agreement’s NDC ambition ratcheting mechanisms allows
for parties to move towards the final goal over time. Finally, unlike Agenda
21, where engagement appears to have gone down over time, the reporting
requirement of the Paris Agreement is obligatory.
Additionally, while sustainable development is a compelling idea, it is
more of an existential imperative rather than a current emergency. The effects
of climate change, on the other hand, while hard to perceive, are getting easier
to identify, as rates of extreme weather events are increasing, icebergs are
melting, and forest fires are growing in frequency and intensity. Thus, there
is perhaps a greater sense of direct threat from climate change than from a
failure to sustainably develop. Furthermore, the push for sustainable
development was an attempt to marry what very well may not be marriageable
ideas: development and environmental protection. The Paris Agreement is
primarily focused on one specific problem: climate change. It includes no
balancing or directly opposing goals of the type Agenda 21 included. This
unitary goal may provide the clarity of action sufficient to support achieving
its goal.
That said, addressing climate change ultimately requires parties to
make unpalatable decisions. While bottom-up agreements are more likely to
pull parties in, they sacrifice ambition in doing so. Ultimately, whether or not
the Paris Agreement succeeds will be a measure of whether the sacrifice of
ambition to facilitate increased participation at the outset leads to the legal,
behavioral, and problem-solving effectiveness necessary for the Agreement
to successfully address climate change. Compliance with NDC reporting
mechanisms and its impact on the behavior of the parties is the heart of the
Agreement’s design. Parties are currently engaged with this process.
Whether they continue, and sufficiently shift their behavior and NDC
ambitions, remains to be seen.
Ultimately, however, even if the Paris Agreement fails in its broader
goal of limiting temperature increases to 1.5°C, fails to prevent catastrophic
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temperature increases, it may still curb climate change. A 2.1°C temperature
increase is very different than a 2.5°C, a 3.0°C, or the 3.7–4.0°C path the
world is currently on based on aggregate emission data.288 For example, a
world with a 3°C increase over pre-industrial times will see Osaka, Japan,
Miami, USA, and Shanghai, China under water.289 In pulling the world
together, year after year, to review progress on mitigating climate change, the
Paris Agreement brings it into the public sphere again and again. Beyond
mitigation, the Paris Agreement also makes room for adaptation and for
addressing the loss and damage faced by many nations such as Kirabati, which
is losing territory as a result of rising seas. As such, it provides a sphere of
collaboration that, as the storms and droughts and forest fires increase in
frequency and severity, recognizes the need to act together to face the current
reality that is climate change.

288

CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, supra note 39.
The three-degree world: the cities that will be drowned by global warming, GUARDIAN (Nov. 3,
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2017/nov/03/three-degree-world-cities-drownedglobal-warming (providing description and mapping of the impact of sea level rise at a 3°C mean temperature
increase by the end of the century).
289

576

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 27 NO. 2

